


Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1954

THIRTY CENTS



Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1954

NUMBER 11

VOLUME 38

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COVER

This 179th Marine Corps Anniversary issue is dedicated to the staff NCO—backbone of the Corps. By his actions, his military bearing and sincere approach to the duties of his chosen profession, he can influence his juniors to follow in his footsteps and, in turn, also become good staff NCOs. The sergeant on the cover carries on the unique traditions bequeathed him by the past, and is the rock on which our Corps must be founded in the future.

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the Gazette do not
necessarily reflect the
attitude of the Navy
Department nor of
Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps

message center

Reflections

... The Marine Corps is as good as its staff noncommissioned officers — no better.

Unless staff noncommissioned officers conduct themselves at all times as staff noncommissioned officers should, it is useless to demand and hopeless to expect that other enlisted men will be otherwise. The enlisted man must have confidence in the ability, sincerity and integrity of the staff noncommissioned officers. He must see the staff noncommissioned officers as shining examples of the best naval and military conduct. NCOs must automatically induce his loyalty; they must inspire his respect and admiration. No staff noncommissioned officer has the right to demand respect—but every staff noncommissioned officer is under obligation to win it. No staff noncommissioned officer can compel the loyalty, respect and admiration of other enlisted men. Such feelings can not be assured by the possession of four, five or six stripes, or by the authority it confers—they can be secured only by the kind of man, by the character that lies beneath the uniform you and I are honored to wear as United States Marines.

Conduct means speech, dress, manner. Our basic military character is directly and faithfully reflected in all of these things and we can expect success or failure as leaders in direct proportion to our efforts along such lines. We must constantly strive to cultivate the correct state of mind and to make it part and parcel of our everyday existence. If the military philosophy seems all wrong and our men are unmilitary, uninterested and irresponsible, let's look to ourselves—let's go look in the mirror for the source of the trouble, for it is the attitude and conduct of the staff noncommissioned officer group that makes or breaks the entire military system of the Marine Corps.

It cannot be too strongly pointed out the urgent need that we, all of us—day in and day out, and regardless of the circumstances, practice what we preach. Matters of correct attitude, personal conduct, bearing and awareness of moral obligations to our men do not lend themselves to control by a set of rules or the mere issue of memoranda and orders. They must be *lived* by the individ-



ual. They are the glory of this Marine Corps of ours and the intangible attributes which are part of the cornerstone of success in the profession of arms. Let's work at being Marines!

BURDETTE E. ODEKIRK, SR.
MSgt, USMC
Cherry Point, N. C.

UCMJ Risky Business

... The article *Three Years Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice* by LtCol O. V. Bergren, appearing in the September issue of the GAZETTE, has been read with considerable interest. It appears that Colonel Bergren has very succinctly reviewed the early years of our operation under the Code. However, he was obviously referring to the case of United States versus Marsh, 3 USCMA 48, 11 CMR 48, when he exclaimed "This startling decision appears to disqualify any

commanding officer from exercising his authority to convene special and general courts-martial in any case where the accused is charged with violation of any orders of the command, no matter how routine."

Fortunately, Colonel Bergren's fears, shared at that time by many others, have proved to be undue since the Court of Military Appeals on 31 December, 1953 in United States versus Robert A. Keith, 3 USCMA 579, 13 CMR 135, discussed the Marsh case further and clearly held that an officer who issues an order which is violated by an accused can convene a court-martial in his case.

The Court, in distinguishing Keith from Marsh, has shown that the convening authority's interest is not a personal one merely because he issued the order. In the ordinary case, routine violation (failure to obey) of the convening authority's orders may be safely referred to a court appointed by him. It still, however, appears to be risky business to charge wilful disobedience of the convening authority's orders.

OLIN W. JONES
LtCol, USMC

Washington, D. C.

Turbine vs Jet

... The author of the article *More Power With Gas Turbines* appearing in the September GAZETTE, has completely "bilged" one of the favorite questions asked in Mechanical Engineering masters' degree comprehensive examinations.

What is the difference between a gas turbine and a jet engine? Each has the same component parts: a compressor, a fire box and a turbine. The answer is simply that the jet depends upon the opposite and equal reaction to its exhaust to push it along. The gas turbine in the jet merely furnishes power for the air compressor. On the other hand, the gas turbine converts to rotary motion in a shaft the power of gases from the fire box using the principles of Newton's Laws in the same manner as the steam turbine. Rotary motion in a shaft and line motion resulting from jet reaction are vastly different.

GEORGE B. BELL
Col, USMC
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Smooth "High Road" to



1. OIL CREWMEN and their baggage are weighed in before boarding an S-55 for a 30-minute flight from the mainland to a barge 45 miles out in the Gulf.

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The pictures on these pages tell the story. They illustrate the smooth "high road" to offshore drilling barges in the Gulf off Texas and Louisiana.



2. S-55 HELICOPTER, loaded with offshore crewmen, takes off from the heliport on a Grand Isle office parking lot.




3. THIRTY MINUTES later the Sikorsky comes in for a gentle landing on the flight deck 45 miles from Grand Isle, Louisiana. By boat, the trip takes tiresome hours.

4.
being
need

to Offshore Drilling Barges

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4. CONVERTED LST with flight deck aft easily accommodates the big Sikorsky helicopter. More and more ships and rigs are being equipped with such heliports. The helicopters eliminate the need—and cost—of standby safety boats at drilling rigs.



5. PASSENGERS alight after safe, easy flight. The helicopter makes any number of required trips each day, handling a steady flow of passengers in each direction between several rigs and the mainland.



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"H" Bomb Planning

. . . No thoughtful Marine can ignore the fact that World War II amphibious landing concepts are no longer practical in their entirety. The Atomic bomb started a drastic revision in our techniques which is still in progress and which was given added impetus by the advent of the Hydrogen bomb. Indeed, more than one Marine must have asked himself the question "Does this mean amphibious landings are obsolete?" At least part of the answer to this question would seem to depend on the economics of atomic warfare; i.e., is an amphibious attack in force worth one, two or a dozen A-bombs, or is it worth a couple H-bombs?

I believe that major amphibious landings make profitable atomic targets for the enemy and that he will not hesitate in striking back with every weapon at his disposal. Any attempt at a landing such as we conducted at Normandy will be, in my opinion, subject to total annihilation for three reasons:

(a) The landing force and most of its fleet will be eliminated in an instant after months of extensive planning, training and stockpiling.

(b) The psychological effect on the civilian population of losing such a formidable force in one instant would be devastating—it alone would make this a worthy target.

(c) Our ability to wage offensive surface warfare would be substantially reduced in one blow.

On the other hand, smaller landings against satellite aggressors in areas remote to the central communist powers will, in my opinion, continue to be practical and effective until a general war is declared.

The fact remains, of course, that if the communists initiate a war and overrun Europe, a landing of some kind will eventually be required. Just how that landing would or could be executed would be an ideal subject for a monograph. Generally speaking, I feel that the lighter tactical units in such a landing will move by air: be it helicopter, parachute, or transport and that the tanks, artillery and service units will be landed on hydro-foils.


If these ideas which I have set down are deemed an accurate appraisal, then the Marine Corps will

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be assured of an active amphibious role in any Korea-type conflicts which might arise in the future. However, if we are to be the leaders in establishing the beachheads of any future World War, let us redouble our efforts at streamlining ourselves and our techniques and let's get a force in being, no matter how small, that is capable of seizing a beachhead against formidable atomic opposition. Let's have our new ideas ready for employment in combat the day the war begins.

My purpose in writing this letter was to promote stimulating discussion of this vital subject among the readers of the GAZETTE.

W. F. WAGNER
Capt, USMC

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Staff Abuse of the System

... Regarding *Coordination Not Subordination*, Major Stubbs has hit on a problem but not, I believe, on the solution to it.

We may assume that TOs assign certain ranks to staff billets, not because some are more important

than others (for the proper functioning of all are necessary to balanced unit performance) but because staff sections require technical experience in differing quantities at different organizational levels. In the final analysis, the problem Major Stubbs sees is really an abuse, rather than a fault, of the system. The problem never arises in the organization where the *commander commands*. The CO is responsible for "everything his unit does or does not" and if dominant personalities and "hard chargers" use their rank to upset the delicate balance between staff sections and staff and subordinate units, the CO must restore the balance or he isn't commanding.

Also, many of us prospective majors don't welcome abolition of all billets for majors in battalion and regimental staffs. Where better can an experienced company commander use his knowledge and prepare himself for command of a battalion?

W. D. MERRILL
Capt, USMC

Oakland, Calif.

... Major Stubbs' proposed staff as offered in his article *Coordination Not Subordination* is a lost cause. Why? Simply because coordination among contemporaries is doomed by the thing most strong (or weak) within us—personality. Leadership ability is a personality trait that influences all staff functions. As humans, whatever our number, one man, through his personality characteristics, becomes the leader.

Coordination among contemporaries runs too close a parallel to that monster called the "democratic army." Normal succession of command is the key to military organization. The staff organization from battalion to division should adhere to such a principle, then coordination will be achieved through the process of intelligent control.

Rank differentiation is a must! The S-3 or G-3 should be the senior member of the staff for in his province revolves military operations—the goal toward which all staff effort is focused.

C. R. STILES
Capt, USMC

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Boot Camp Heros

... Upon reading the comments by 2dLt Richard T. Ferry concerning SSgt Clingman's letter, *Recruiter's Suggestion*, I must reply.

SSgt Clingman's portrayal (July issue) of the so-called "Boot Camp Hero" who returns home with fantastic tales of his recruit training is a fair, honest and accurate portrayal of an intolerable situation. I have seen instances . . . which led to an irate mother writing the President of the United States setting forth in detail the ordeals and torture her son had been subjected to. This resulted in official action and when confronted by military authorities demanding names, dates and specific instances, this "Boot Camp Hero" was shorn of his cloak of fantasy and admitted his tales were mere figments of an overworked and improperly applied imagination. But irreparable damage had already been done to the prestige of our Corps. The Recruiting Service is constantly hampered by this problem. One "Boot Camp Hero" in a small town can completely destroy

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the good will, prestige and the public relations which recruiters have built up through the proper application of sound recruiting principles. Lieutenant Ferry has alleged that his hero, and his tales, are sound recruiting and will attract the caliber of men the Marine Corps wants. What the Lieutenant doesn't realize is that this type of publicity prejudices the parents who must be sold as well as the man, because through their influence, they are the deciding factor on their son's enlisting in the Marine Corps. The Recruiting Service does not advocate the "soft touch" referred to by Lieutenant Ferry, but we do not appreciate interference from these 10-week veterans. I am certain that a short tour of recruiting duty will convince any nonbelievers.

R. J. THOMAS
Capt, USMC

Jackson, Miss.


Pockmarked Shirts

. . . The undersigned, during the early part of this year had occasion to make a cash purchase of six shirts, cotton khaki, and four trousers, service summer which amounted to about \$30.00.

I first removed the white stickers pasted to different sections of the items concerned, had chevrons sewed on the shirts and sent the whole batch to the laundry. Upon receiving them from the laundry I noted that there were red marks each place where the manufacturer's stickers had been affixed. After about 12 repeated washings the same condition prevailed. Upon joining this station in June, I tried our Base Laundry — result: no success. Net result of all this: I still have ten articles of "pockmarked" uniform clothing, purchased with good intention, which are unfit for display or wearing at any type of inspection.

In these days when neatness and military bearing are being stressed to the utmost, it is the opinion of the writer that a more thorough inspection of enlisted clothing be made prior to release to the supply agencies of the Corps.

ROBERT L. NORRISH
MSgt, USMC
Camp Lejeune, N. C.



Radiological safety man aboard Army helicopter checks ground for radiation after atomic blasts at Yucca Flats.

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our authors

• Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton is another on the long list of people who feel that "our awards (system) and their criteria can be improved." He takes a critical *Look At Our Awards* on page 24. After entering the Corps from the University of Kentucky and completing Basic School at Philadelphia in 1941, Colonel Batterton was sent to England where he was a company



LTCOL BATTERTON

officer in the Embassy Detachment and later Officer in Charge of the Marine training detachment with the British Commandos. In 1942 he was assigned to the 4th Raider Bn at Camp Pendleton and was with that outfit overseas. School and regular duties followed until 1952 when he joined the 1st Marines in Korea. He also served as Senior Advisor, Korean Marine Corps Schools. He is currently Administrative Officer, Personnel Dept., HQMC.

• Major John H. Magruder III, author of *Sergeant's Sword* (page 33) and *Chevrons* (page 54), was on a junk expedition in the Far East when WWII broke out in Europe. He joined British forces in the Middle East and after the attack on Pearl Harbor came home to a commission in the Marine Corps. He was with the 2d MarDiv from its activation through Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan and Tinian. From 1944 to the end of the war, he served on the staff of SHAEF as British Royal Navy liaison officer to Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group in an advisory capacity for the river crossings in the Low Countries. He was released to inactive duty after the war but was recalled in 1952 and assigned to Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, to set up a Marine exhibit

at the Smithsonian Institute. A well known and talented artist, Major Magruder's set of paintings of Marine Uniforms (still available through the GAZETTE) are part of the exhibit. He is currently representing the Corps, working on another historical exhibit which will make a country-wide tour in the near future.

• The Old Drill is in at most Marine Corps installations—but what do the troops have to say about it? Since the GAZETTE couldn't take an overall consensus, we selected letters to the editor from two staff NCOs, one from the West Coast (Camp Pendleton) and the other from the East (Quantico).

MSgt Edward J. Evans takes the *Con* approach



MSGT EVANS

and TSgt Donald E. Kelly takes the *Pro* (page 22). MSgt Evans entered the Corps in 1941, just seven months before Kelly. Both were in the Pacific during the war. Evans is now with the Marine Corps Motion Picture Production Unit at Camp Pendleton while TSgt Kelly has just been transferred from Quantico.

• Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., looks back at his 17 years in the Corps to present his ideas on the differences between today's NCOs and those in the Corps prior to WWII (*NCOs—a Challenge from Within*—page 42). A Yale graduate, the Colonel reported to Basic School through the NROTC in 1937. He was at Pearl Harbor at the outset of WWII and served in the Pacific throughout the war. Before going to Korea in 1952, Colonel Heinl was with Historical Section, HQMC and an instructor at Quantico. He is currently in England serving as the Marine Corps Representative, Amphibious Warfare Center, Falmouth, North Devon. The Colonel recently had the privilege of person-

ally representing the Commandant of the Marine Corps at a memorial dedication in Bickleigh, England, honoring the dead of the 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines who were killed in Korea while operating with 1st MarDiv.

• A St. Johns University product, Major John L. Tobin wrote *Morale* (page 40). Major Tobin was a member of the 11th Reserve Officers Course, receiving his commission in 1942. He was with the 1st MAW in the South Pacific from 1942-44 and returned to NAS, Miramar for two years after the war. He was in China from 1947 to 1949 and with the 1st Mar Div at Camp Pendleton until the Korean action,


going overseas with the 1st Prov Brig in 1950. Recruiting in Houston, Texas took up two more years before he reported to Quantico to attend the Junior Course, after which he assumed the duties of an Instructor in the Tactics Section, Junior School.

• Back in the early days of WWI, Frank O. Hough, author of *Dan Daly* (page 30), ran away from school to enlist. He was with the AEF in France, worked up to sergeant and returned to school after the shooting was over. From 1919 until WWII broke out, he completed studies at Brown University (class of '24) and then did advertising-editorial work and free-lance writing. He was commissioned a Captain in 1942 on the basis of his professional background and previous combat service. At the end of the war he was released to inactive duty and later published




LTCOL HOUGH

The Island War, the first overall account of the Marines in the Pacific. He was called back in 1948 to join the Historical Writing Program which he now heads.




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
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CASE FOR THE EN



1920s

By LtCol H. W. Edwards



1930s

ENLISTED PILOT



We might get along without the old slouch hat but the enlisted pilot has earned a permanent billet in the Marine Corps T/O

LIKE THE CAMPAIGN HAT AND the field music, the familiar and respected Naval Aviation Pilot is fast disappearing from the Marine Corps scene. Present count shows a total of only 136 flying sergeants.

Is this desirable?

Time was when there were several hundred of these colorful enlisted flyers in the Corps and their exploits are legion. Since January, 1916 when the opportunity was first afforded enlisted men to achieve pilot status in the Naval Aviation Program, some thousand Marines have earned their coveted gold wings. The scheme, germinated in Congressional hearings during 1914, was made effective a year later when Captain Mark L. Bristol, Naval Director of Aeronautics, issued a call for eight chiefs or petty officers and two Marine corps first sergeants or sergeant majors from the USS *North Carolina* or the aeronautic station to see "if they will answer as pilots as well as mechanicians."

Though records are obscure on Marines who accepted this offer of school training, the first enlisted man to enter Marine aviation was Sgt Jacob Makohin. A little later came 1st Sgt Victor H. Czegka and Cpl Walter E. McCaughtry. McCaughtry was to become the first warrant-officer pilot in the Marine Corps. All of these men owed their original training to the "seat-of-the-pants" school rather than to orthodox flight training.

Subsequent to this experimental group, a class of eight Navy and two Marine enlisted were ordered to be sent to Pensacola beginning in April, 1916 and every three months thereafter. By 1919, the designation, Naval Aviation Pilot, was in use and in March, 1924 it became an official rating. Although frequently shortened to NAP, or even AP, this appellation was thereafter used to designate enlisted pilots as contrasted with Naval Aviator (NA) for officer pilots. Prior to 1919 it was

the practice to order enlisted men to duty involving flying without any specific title attached.

In 1920, preliminary flight training and ground school instruction was instituted at NAS, San Diego, for suitable enlisted men. Flight training there was limited to dual instruction in N-9 training planes with sufficient solo time to achieve fair proficiency.

Four classifications were established in late 1921. These were: Naval Aviation Pilot (Seaplane), Naval Aviation Pilot (Ship-plane), Naval Aviation Pilot (Airship) and Balloon Pilot. Contained in a letter from the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, is the earliest available Marine Corps record of actual NAP designations for Marine enlisted. Dated 24 June, 1921 the letter to BuNav contained the names of seven men for "original aviation designations." But on 2 December, the Commandant returned the Marines' designations, explaining that the



1940s



1950s



men should have been designated "Balloon Pilot" instead of Naval Aviation Pilot (Free and Kite Balloon). These Marines were subsequently designated Balloon Pilots, and not until 1923 do records indicate the use of the designation, Naval Aviation Pilot for Marines.

On 21 June, 1923 the Major General Commandant authorized commanding officers of Marine squadrons to train and keep in training "at all times" five enlisted men under their commands as Naval Aviation Pilots in accordance with the course prescribed in the "Syllabus for the Training of Naval Aviators and Naval Aviation Pilots—Airplanes." In accordance with the Commandant's directive, upon successful completion of the course of training outlined in the syllabus, the commanding officer could recommend to the commandant that the enlisted men be designated NAPs. However, any enlisted men who could qualify in practical and theoretical flying as outlined in the syllabus could be recommended for designation at once. The directive ended with the admonition that henceforth "the only enlisted men who will be allowed to carry passengers will be those authorized Naval Aviation Pilots."

Less than three weeks later the Commanding Officer of Marine Observation Squadron One, stationed in Santo Domingo, recommended that 1stSgt Benjamin F. Belcher, Gy Sgts Neil W. Abbott and Archie Paschal be designated Naval Aviation Pilots. All three were so designated on 14 September, 1923—Belcher had 300, Abbott had 200 and Paschal had 125 hours of solo time. Belcher was thereby accredited as the first NAP in the Marine Corps.

On 27 September, 1923 GySgt Millard T. Shepard was classified an NAP and on 31 December, GySgt Peter P. Tolusciak became the fifth NAP designated during 1923. During this time about a hundred had been so designated by the Navy;

two-thirds serving with fleet air squadrons, the other third at shore stations.

With Naval schools at Pensacola and San Diego as well as Marine schools in Quantico and Guam, all turning out enlisted pilots to meet a shortage in fliers, the number of graduates swelled steadily. These men found employment in 1924 largely as second pilots in torpedo, bombing, scouting and observation planes and as ferry pilots. The NAP program was really in business.

Unfortunately, attrition rates were found to be higher among enlisted than among officers, with crackups occurring more frequently. This result contributed toward suspension of the program until 1926 when another shortage of pilots brought about the Act of 24 June, 1926 requiring 30 per cent of all Naval pilots to come from enlisted ranks. Openings for 153 volunteers from the ranks were announced by BuNav as a result of this legislation, but at the end of 1927 only 100 NAP's were on duty.

Most suitable means of employment for the enlisted fliers was studied by a board convened at Pensacola in 1927. Deficiencies in education were noted. At that time, it should be pointed out, the program did not call for a screening of applicants based on techniques now considered essential. As later developments reveal, the attrition rate was probably not attributable to

deficiencies in education but rather to an inability to select candidates who were suited by physical and temperamental standards to become aviators.


Hardly touching the crux of the problem were the Board's recommendations that candidates: have a high-school education or its equivalent; meet the age requirements for officers candidates; hold an aviation rating; be serving in a second or third enlistment; be given a course of training the same length as officer trainees and be given improved training in squadrons. Failure to correct the real shortcomings in procurement caused the aviation pilot program to be continually plagued with an abnormally high percentage of failures among enlisted student pilots, such that the 30 per cent quota could not be realized.

Further study of the problem brought forth a recommendation by BuNav that student APs be given preliminary elimination training at Hampton Roads and San Diego. Concurred in by BuAer, a joint letter was issued to provide as follows:

"Order specially selected volunteer recruits who have completed recruit training, who are physically and psychologically qualified, and who request aeronautical training, in sufficient numbers to secure from among those who successfully undergo an elimination course at Hampton Roads and San Diego, approxi-

Balloon pilots — they had to "know the ropes"





USS North Carolina — two 1st Sergeants were picked to fly

mately ten per week, qualified and recommended for further training. Upon completion of the elimination course, those not successful will be sent to the ten weeks general utility course at Great Lakes, and thereafter to duty under observation and training aboard the *Lexington* or *Saratoga*. After six months on board, those recommended by their respective Commanding Officers will be retained for an additional six months, and if not then recommended will be sent to Pensacola for training. Those not recommended will be retained for an additional six months, and if not then recommended for training at Pensacola will be sent to general duty."

Adoption of the elimination training system on 3 January, 1929 seemed to have a desirable effect on the turnout of enlisted pilots for the Marine Corps. Having averaged less than a dozen graduates per year previously, the number in 1932 went to 35 and remained in the thirties thereafter. Between 14 September, 1923 and 3 November, 1930 57 enlisted men were designated NAPs. But by 1930 only 24 were still in the Marine Corps.

Elimination training was still not acceptable to certain elements of the Navy as represented by Rear Admiral W. A. Moffett who persisted in considering the enlisted pilot training program "wasteful." This school of thought was blown out of the water when the attrition rate in the flight course at once dropped from 75 to 60 per cent as a result of elimination training.

Unfortunately for the program,

budget cuts became the order of the day just as the program was getting into high gear. Enlisted training was greatly curtailed and those already graduated were frozen in present pay grades. The program was temporarily stopped in 1930 after 395 men had been sent to Pensacola. Of these, 236 finished the course and 97 were qualified as NAPs. This was the best record achieved so far and the combined output of all Naval and Marine training facilities brought the Naval air five-year building program to its assigned goal of 1,000 aviators.

The Navy decried the principle of a fixed 30 per cent ratio of enlisted aviators in the program, so Congress reduced the percentage to 20 by Act of 30 June, 1932. This change permitted the Navy to lapse the enlisted training program until 1936, at which time it was resumed on a limited scale sufficient to maintain the 20 per cent requirement. However, as the number of naval aviators began to increase in the aviation cadet program, so also did the aviation pilot program accelerate in the order of five to one. From a low of 480 NAPs in 1939, the on-board figure had climbed to 1,036 by 1942; 131 of these were Marines. Thereafter, the number declined during the war until the program was finally discontinued with the graduation of the last class in December 1947. However, oddly enough, the number of enlisted Marine pilots reached an all-time high total of 366 in 1948 since a large number of fliers who had accepted commissions during the war reverted to enlisted

status in keeping with the restricted budget conditions.

A further blow to the program was dealt by Congress on 13 June, 1949 when the 20 per cent requirement for enlisted pilots was changed to provide that at least 20 per cent of all aviation cadets assigned to flight training be designated from the enlisted men of the regular Navy and Marine Corps. This sounded the death knell for the NAP program while at the same time it established the Naval Cadet Program which, of course, led to the designation of Naval Aviators in commissioned officer status upon graduation.


While the approximately 560 Naval Aviation Pilots still flying in the Navy are assigned duties primarily as helicopter, transport and utility pilots, many of the Marines' intrepid band of 136 flying sergeants piloted Corsair fighters and Panther jets in Korea. Individual accounts of their combat heroics illuminated the pages of monthly command diaries sent in by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

One instance I particularly like to recall was that of an airstrike executed for my battalion in the vicinity of Hill 884 on a cold February day of 1952. On that occasion four Corsairs clobbered some enemy bunkers and gun positions with a good 90 per cent coverage. On receiving a report of the results of their strike and before flying away, they announced over the TAC radio, "Courtesy of three enlisted pilots and one reserve!"

The advisability of discarding the Naval Aviation Pilot training program would certainly appear open to serious question.

Most of the woes of a top-heavy rank distribution that have continued to plague the Marine aviation program might have been resolved by continued emphasis on NAP training. Why should there be majors and lieutenant colonels flying a large number of missions in Korea today with no command larger than their own aircraft? Aviation in general seems to violate the normal conception of rank as an instrument of command.

Would it not be feasible to have a system similar to that employed in the tank battalion with a platoon of five vehicles commanded by an offi-




1914 — 1stSgt Victor Czegka



1954 — MSgt John Cain

USS Saratoga — basic school for NAPs



cer? His is the responsibility for all five and he is rated and paid accordingly. The enlisted tank commanders have a fine opportunity to gain experience, and by their demonstrated ability, earn a commission just as they do in all branches today and could very well do in aviation. These men take pride in their assignments and responsibilities and there is a desirable spirit of competition established for individual achievement. So should there be in aviation.

Immediately the objection will be registered that Naval Aviators have too difficult a job to permit the assignment of enlisted men on a large scale. The aircraft are too complex. The educational requirements are too great.

Wake Island — enlisted pilots flew to the end of the last-ditch stand



In answer, the record of enlisted pilots speaks for itself.

Although dozens of NAPs have flown to fame in the intervening years between 1923 and World War II, 1stSgt Belcher and GySgt Tolusciak are probably the best known among the early "birdmen" of the Marine Corps. Belcher enlisted early in 1917 and was detailed to flying duty in Miami on 30 March, 1919. While not actually designated NAP until 1923, he had more than 300 hours' solo time, picked up in the flight-by-seat-of-the-pants method of the '20s. He had served with squadrons in Haiti, Quantico and Santo Domingo in his first three years in aviation as a mechanic, and as such participated in several long-distance flights of that era. The most noted was the one made between Haiti and San Francisco in 1923 which covered 10,953 miles. It was the longest in American aviation history and the second longest in the world up to that time. Only the 12,500-mile flight made by Sir Rose Smith of the Royal Air Force exceeded it.

The Marine flight was made in two planes, one flown by 1stLt Ford (Tex) O. Rogers accompanied by Belcher, while attached to the 1st Observ Sq, 2d Brig, in Santo Domingo. The other was manned by 2dLt Horace (Hoke) D. Palmer and Sergeant Tolusciak of the 2d Ob-

serv Sq, 1st Brig, in Haiti.

Tolusciak, although not designated an NAP until the end of 1923, had flown in Europe after World War I at the age of 18. Leaving Duquesne University in 1918, to join the Polish Legion of the French Army being organized in Canada, he obtained his pilot's license on 5 November, 1919. He served in the Polish aerial service until 1 December, 1920, and distinguished himself at Kiev during the Polish-Bolshevik campaign. Before enlisting in the Marine Corps in April, 1922, he had flown 208 hours and participated in 37 actions in France and Poland.

In Lieutenant Rogers' (now Brig. Gen, USMC, Ret) report of the noted distance flight, he said of Belcher and Tolusciak:

"I cannot say too much for the two enlisted men who accompanied us. Sergeant Tolusciak is an excellent pilot, a good mechanic and a cheerful and tireless worker. From the start to the finish of the trip his work and conduct were exemplary. Owing to his age and his former experience as a pilot in the French Army and an officer in the Polish Army, he is valuable officer material for the Marine Corps."

Tolusciak never lived to justify Rogers' high esteem of him. He was killed in a crash in Haiti on 24 January, 1925, while flying with GySgt Merle V. Slocum.



Of Sergeant Belcher, Rogers said:

"First Sergeant Belcher is in my opinion as good a pilot (officers included) as there is in the Marine Corps. He is recognized throughout the Marine Corps as the best aviation mechanic that has ever been in the service. Personally and professionally he is a credit to any organization and is unquestionably the most valuable enlisted man in all Marine Corps Aviation."

Belcher continued to serve in Marine aviation until 1938 when he was killed in the crash of a JO-2 at Quantico, Virginia.

There was also Sergeant Millard T. Shepard, one of the first five designated NAPs in 1923, who was copilot on the first flight over the Caribbean with Major Edwin H. Brainard. In the following year he made nearly 1,000 flights and as many hours in Nicaragua without accident in the same Fokker.

Master Technical Sergeant Albert S. Munsch, designated an NAP in September, 1925, piloted one of the planes in the Battle of Ocotal in 1927. He received the DFC for par-

Walsh—top ace and Medal of Honor man. He started as a NAP



Today—only 136 left





ticipation in an attack against Sandino's position on El Chipote Mountain five months later, after which Sandino's organized resistance ceased. Munsch flew 827 hours over the heavily wooded and hazardous mountainous country while attached to the Aircraft Squadrons, 2d Brig. in Nicaragua. He had risen to Marine Gunner by 1939 and in World War II attained the rank of lieutenant colonel and commanded both a photographic and a transport squadron during that conflict.

World War II records are full of heroism of NAPs, or erstwhile ones. TSgt William J. Hamilton and SSgt Robert O. Arthur will be long remembered for their aerial exploits and mechanical wizardry in the last-ditch stand at Wake Island in 1942.

Second Lieutenant John F. Fogerty designated an aviation pilot in 1933 and Warrant Officer Henry B. Hamilton, designated in 1938, were both lost at Guadalcanal; Hamilton only after shooting down seven Jap planes. Major Kenneth A. Walsh, one of the eleven Marine aviators to win the Medal of Honor in World War II and fourth on the list of Marine Corps aces with 21 planes to his credit, was designated an NAP in 1937.

In the Leyte, Philippine Islands, operations of VMF(N)-541, TSgt John W. Andre made four of the 22 kills credited to that squadron.

Flying an airplane, in the opinion of pilots, is in many respects like driving a car. You must practice to become expert at it but it is not something that the majority of the population cannot do. So, then, is a college education essential to spawn a good pilot?

On this point the findings of Dr. John T. Bair, in a Research Report dated 28 April 1952 for the U. S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine, are most pertinent. Dr. Bair summarizes as follows:

"1. These findings suggest that attrition in the Naval Air Training Program would be reduced by selecting candidates from high school

graduates with high flight aptitude test scores, rather than from a college trained group with poor pre-training academic performance and low flight aptitude test ratings.

"2. The results indicate that the cadets most likely to complete the program are those who are less than 21 years of age, completed only high school and had no academic course failures prior to entering the program."

So much for the college education theory. Modern tests and devices for selecting flight students have disproved the old argument that enlisted attrition was based on deficiencies in education.

THE OTHER SIDE of the coin is that by taking men out of high school you get young pilots who are more eager to fly and consequently easier to recruit and who have many years of useful service ahead. These are the "hot pilots" who can give their 18-year-old contemporaries on the ground the kind of close support they are entitled to and must have. As they become more experienced by building up flight time and show promise generally, they should be commissioned just as line NCOs are so recognized.

Doubtless, there are other arguments against the NAP program. Too expensive a machine to risk on an enlisted flier? The answer is that his own life is at stake and he is certainly not going to jeopardize that unnecessarily whether he is driving a \$200,000 Patton tank or a \$1,000,000 Sabre jet.

No place on carriers for enlisted pilots since they are neither fish nor fowl? That may have been true when there were but a few on board, but when their number becomes substantial, arrangements can surely be made just as they have frequently done on troop transports for top pay grades among line NCOs to utilize ward room and cabin facilities. The unusual camaraderie among aviation personnel should easily resolve this problem since on shore duty it has never even existed.

Yet another. The degree of risk involved demands the reward of a commissioned status. Here, the statistics published by the U. S. Army for World War II operations may be of interest. They reveal that ground

forces suffered 81 per cent of the American Army's battle losses and of these 70 per cent were borne by the infantry which comprised only 20.5 per cent of the total strength overseas. This is hardly a situation to attract a bright young man into the infantry, but the volunteer status of the Marine Corps is sufficient proof that it can be done. It would seem likely that many of these lads would welcome a shot at pilot's wings even when worn with chevrons rather than a gold bar. In fact, one of the favorite questions asked of procurement officers concerns the prospects of transferring into the Marine aviation program after enlistment. The prospect of learning to fly for free, and a subsequent career in military or civilian aviation is a formidable inducement to recruiting high school age youngsters. The new Naval Aviation Cadet program makes this possible for men with some college training or those who pass college equivalent tests.

Granted there will be other considerations both pro and con on the program. The enlisted pilot may not be the solution to the major difficulties plaguing military aviation, but has he been given a fair trial with the benefit of modern training methods? The rank structure needs to be balanced; there should be more use made of the "golden period" of a fighter pilot's career — his youth, when rank and age combine to keep him on the combat flight line in his squadron; aptitude rather than education should govern procurement. Again, the prospect offered by an enlisted aviator putting in spare time working on his plane's engines, which has been a long established practice among NAPs, certainly offers more promise toward the development of skilled birdmen than do the non-flying duties of most Naval pilots; savings in maintenance and pilot salaries should be of interest to cost conscious military planners. Finally, the record compiled by enlisted Marine fliers speaks volumes.

We can get along without the old felt hat and a whistle may make us forget the bugler, but those guys with the chevrons and gold wings have justified a permanent position in our Marine Corps air-ground team.

US MC

NEW LOOK for LFM's



Major Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.

YOU'D BETTER TAKE A GOOD LONG look at those drab, old manila-covered Landing Force Manuals that fill your bookshelves and field desks. It may be your last. The landing Force Manuals are going to have a new look.

If you were reading publications back in 1885, you found some similarities between the *Marines' Manual*, published that year, and the out-going LFM's of 1954. The standard phrase that introduces each LFM is the same one that introduced the *Marines' Manual* of 1885 and not telling how many before it. The 1885 format was not too different from the one LFM's have been following since. But all that is passe.

Flashy new manuals will soon be filling the slots now occupied by your khaki-clad LFM's. You'll find the new books labeled LFM's and the subjects will be the same. There the resemblance ends. The dull, old manuals had a foreboding, ivory-tower air about them that you had

to overcome before coming to grips with the subject matter. The colorful, new ones will fairly beg you to read them.

If this sounds too good to be true, it's only the beginning. In addition to their come-hither look (it's called "motivation" in the trade), these manuals will actually be easier to read. They will be better illustrated and each LFM will be written more carefully and exactly to suit its major user. Besides, the new books will contain more fresh, field-thinking than any previous series has been able to inject.

This new look in LFM's is the product of extensive Marine Corps studies into the realm of best utilizing what we know about "legibility" and what makes for "readability." The new format resulted from research performed by the Editorial and Manuals Section, Marine Corps Schools. While the Schools were studying format, Headquarters Marine Corps was keeping a watchful

eye on the whole project and studying ways of rapidly injecting field-thinking into our manuals.

At Quantico, the Editorial and Manuals Section undertook the job of distilling the many related studies. Headquarters Marine Corps G-3 Section, likewise, were holding up the Headquarters end of the job and master-minding the over-all project. These authorities on training literature set up procedures whereby Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, were assigned responsibility to review specified LFM's. Major commands over the Corps were designated to assist in these reviews.

Comment from these reviews is now arriving at Headquarters Marine Corps on a definitely-scheduled basis. Many of these comments extend to completely rewritten manuals. Others merely up-date matter that has become obsolete because of new procedures, definitions, or tactics and techniques that the Marine

Corps is evolving constantly. When these comments are evaluated and edited they will find their way into revitalized LFM's.

You'll spot these revitalized publications by the familiar official Marine Corps colors of scarlet and gold. The cover is made of scarlet plastic coated fiber with the LFM number, title, the Marine Corps emblem and the words "United States Marine Corps" in gold lettering.

A great deal of study went into the decision to adopt these colors. All colors of presently-manufactured,


size without damage to the book.

Designers of the new book had to face-up to the problem of changes. Pen changes require many man-hours in the field and they make the book hard to read. Studying this problem caused the adoption of a loose-leaf binding. Aluminum screw posts will hold the book together. Brass posts were conventional in many old manuals, but brass costs more and corrodes more quickly than aluminum.

Studies leading up to the Corps' new look in manuals focused on an

to like the Marine Corps. The theory here is that a Marine who has to study from an almost illegible piece of mimeographed dope is less likely to ship-over than a Marine who studies from a well-prepared manual that he likes to read. This theory is supported in scientific studies that show a definite correlation between student motivation and the caliber of training literature used.

Second, they should motivate a reader to be a good Marine. These books should be so written as to inspire readers to be good Marines. They do this by slanting text and illustrations to tell a true, but pointed, story of the Corps' pre-eminence in amphibious warfare. Marines are consistently pictured in correct uniform, doing perfectly the



acceptable cover material were considered initially. The choice was finally narrowed down to green with silver letters and scarlet with gold lettering. The Commandant of the Marine Corps made the final decision to adopt manuals covered with our official colors.

Manual size was another problem. Many factions pulled for field-manual size. Some wanted larger books similar to the size of Naval Warfare Publications. Others favored sizes between these extremes. An eight-by 11-inch format won out. This size conveniently fits into Marine Corps standard field desks. As consolation to supporters of the field-manual-size, the new LFM's can be folded to utility trouser (or shirt)

important factor called "motivation." That's the intangible something that makes you want to read a book or a magazine. You're motivated when you spend 20 cents to buy *Life* magazine and then sit down and read it. We couldn't dress up our Marine books with pretty girls the way *Life* does, but we could adapt some of the motivation possessed by modern slick magazines. The color and format was part of this adaptation. Real motivation, though, must be created inside the cover of each book. This was the really big challenge.

In order for LFM's to give maximum return for the effort that goes into them, they should do more than motivate Marines to read them. First, they should motivate a reader

correct thing at the proper time.

Third, they should motivate a reader to be not only a good Marine, but also a fighting Marine. The entire book should be prepared in a way that "sells" aggressiveness and manuals on specialists arms should have strong undertones that motivate readers to be expert Marine infantrymen before they are anything else.

The first page inside the new format starts the motivating. It will be an artist's conception of something that will inspire the average reader of the book. One dummy LFM prepared at Marine Corps Schools was called *Air Observation*. Its first page was a picture of a Marine air observer. A blaze of sun

had just caught the observer's glasses. His eyes had the familiar squint of a Marine aloft, searching for a target. Any air observer would feel an affinity for this book as soon as he turned the cover. If the book is LFM-14, *Tanks*, the inside picture will be designed to appeal to a tanker. If it is LFM-10 on communications, the artist will strive for a picture that inspires the communicators and so on throughout the series. This process is extended to the remainder of each manual insofar as is possible. All editing is accomplished with motivating factors in mind and motivation is given heavy weight in the choice of illustrations.

Maximum motivation is strived for throughout the preparation of each LFM. This means that a con-

more easily it will be understood and used by more people.

2) LFM's will be more interesting if there are:

- a. more verbs and fewer adjectives.
- b. more image-bearing and human interest words in the text.
- c. more localisms (i.e., terms often used and familiar in the Corps) and words learned early in life.


That listing is merely to touch on the subject. Also considered were many points discussed in *Let's Learn To Write* (GAZETTE, April, '54).

How readable our manuals are in this respect will depend on the many Marines who write text and submit revisions. A great deal of optimism would seem to be in order on this point.

Out of a maze of technical information studied at Quantico there

comprehension and retention. Aside from a Marine being happy about his books, wanting to read them and finding them readable, he must first comprehend and then retain what he reads. Otherwise, the Corps is not getting maximum return for the effort that goes into the LFM series. It was concluded that these factors would be obtained, provided that the factors already discussed were properly injected into each manual. For example, the same pictures that motivate would be designed to assist the reader in understanding difficult points in the text. They would also be designed to strike the reader in a way that he is least likely to forget.

In a program so loaded with intangibles, there is many a slip between the plan and the finished product. However, there is already an absolutely new look in Landing Force Manuals. There is every indi-



stant effort is made to turn out text that is clear, interesting and stimulating.

After maximum motivation, the problem of readability was tackled at Quantico. Here is where serious thought was given to the subject of what makes for readability. Grammar-wise, readability calls for text that is simple enough for the audience at which the book is aimed, and yet not simple enough to insult the intelligence of that audience. This phase of the study ran the gamut of readability studies after such basic initial conclusions as these:

1) The more frequently a word appears in newspapers, books, magazines and other printed media, the

emerged a format that has maximum readability as far as typography is concerned. The new manuals will contain two-column pages. Each column will be 18 picas wide with two picas between columns. This GAZETTE page is set in three columns of 18½ picas each, with one pica between columns. LFM type faces will be 10-point type on a 12-point slug. The GAZETTE you are reading is 10-point type on an 11-point slug. All that means the new look will contain the very latest in maximum readability.

After finding an approach to maximum motivation and readability, the Schools considered maximum

cation that it will attain the goals that its designers had in view for the Landing Force Manual series. That is, a series of books that adequately represent the Marine Corps' lead in its legally assigned mission of developing tactics and techniques for amphibious warfare and which, at the same time, possess maximum motivation, readability and retention characteristics.

No one denies that a better educated Marine is a better fighting Marine. The new look in LFM's will make it easier and more pleasant for all Marines to be better educated in the tricks of their trade. USMC

PRO...

SQUADS



By TSgt Donald E. Kelly

THE RETURN TO THE OLD DRILL as reported in the August GAZETTE under the title of *Squads Right*, is the greatest morale shot in the arm that the Marines have had since the Inchon landing.

It is particularly gratifying to note that the Marine Corps' leaders, after evaluating and observing both systems, have the courage and wisdom to bring back a once discarded drill even at the risk of being accused of using antiquated tactics.

Perhaps the most telling effect of the change will be noted in Post and Station Marines, an angle which I feel was taken into consideration and was an important factor in the Commandant's decision to bring back the Old Drill.

The majority of Marines today have had little or no contact with the 1927 LFM drill. Post Marines, burdened by the continuous and time-consuming "housekeeping" duties, have grown stale in their primary functions and are now faced with the realization that they are also Marines.

This is not intended as a reflection on these men but, rather, a recognition of the invaluable "booster charge" that the Old Drill has given them.

Faced with this new challenge, the Posts Marines are responding and have profited immeasurably by the experience.

Many arguments against the system have been raised by the new-issue die-hards.

Two of the most prevalent complaints are: it takes too much time to teach the men a new system, and; too many men are excused from drill because of essential work.

These can be answered by example.

In my company, a typical headquarters group, all personnel fell out for training in the Old Drill for one hour each day before working hours. True, it meant an advance in reveille, chow and regular clean-up details, but no one died from over-work, lack of sleep or exposure. And in a few weeks, it was apparent that the ends justified the means.

"The new drill is contrary to the present tactical set-up." So What!! Marines are not being required to

Ed: These two articles were originally submitted as letters to Message Center. Because of their divergent views they are presented here for comment.

forget the other drill, only to learn an additional one. When we are engaged in trench warfare we do not forget jungle tactics. Tactics are flexible and the men must be ready to meet any changes. No one ever suffered from knowing two ways to do one job.

"The same personnel are not always involved in the practice for the Old Drill." All the better! Every man has the opportunity to learn the entire operation or maneuver, not just his part. In the new drill a few men have the responsibility and the rest just follow. In the Old Drill each man has a particular job to do and the success of the entire movement depends on how well he does his job. Will he risk being pinpointed as the "eight ball?" Would you?

By and large, these are the main complaints about the Old Drill and amount to nothing more than the usual griping about a little extra work. No great obstacle stands in the way of including the Old Drill

in the present day training.

Now to look at points in its favor.

The most obvious one is the smartness and polished appearance of men using the Old Drill. Nothing will instill pride in a body of men quicker than to know that they are the sharpest group on the parade ground. Now, with the new challenge at hand, the competitive spirit runs high among the Posts Marines.

Revived interest in parade and ceremonial procedures as a whole is evident, carrying over even into off-duty discussions in the barracks. And when the duties of number three man in the front rank replace the price of comic books at the Post Exchange as the subject of conversation, that is a healthy sign.

In the use of the Old Drill, the squad leader is responsible for the control of the squad. This places the responsibility for leadership and command where it belongs, on the shoulders of the noncommissioned officers. No NCO can allow himself to become rusty in drill procedure as the actions of his squad would immediately point up his failings. This will, in effect, demand that a Marine be an NCO in ability and practice rather than in rank only.

If only for the mental alertness that the drill will instill in every Marine, it is worth the extra effort and time involved.

It is not intended, at this time, to have the Old Drill replace the new. It will augment the practices now in use and allow the individual Marine to depend upon himself, not upon "the other guy."

In the final analysis, nothing will be lost by the additional training and a good deal can be gained.

By all means "Squads Right."

USMC

RIGHT

...CON



By MSgt Edward J. Evans

THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND EXPLANATION of the Marine Corps' return to the old "obsolete" infantry drill, under the heading *Squads Right*, arouses protest against this step backward. We of the Corps are always concerned with the preservation of valuable customs and traditions, but to my mind the justification for this reversion does not seem valid.

Your article opens with the statement, "... back . . . to 1939." Why move backward 15 years? Let's keep moving forward. It further states that the new Old Drill will be adopted by Marine Barracks, Ships' Detachments, Recruit Depots and other non-FMF units. Why, I ask, should we encumber ourselves with a dual set of infantry drill regulations, especially when the set being revived is more cumbersome and time consuming than the one which replaced it so long ago?

In the arguments favoring the return of the Old Drill is the claim that with its abandonment there came "... loss of obedience and disciplinary features in that the new drill lacked the snap and precision of the old." Further arguments are spiced with such statements as "... mental alertness would not be as high" . . . with the new drill and the whole summarized by, "... In addition, the development of leadership and command presence in junior officers and NCOs suffered." [sic]

The Old Drill was at its peak when I came into service in 1937. We were then looking for more flexible combat structures, a project at that time several generations old. The answer had been provided as long ago as 1888 by naval genius D. H. Mahan, the younger. In this

case, I again turn to GAZETTE files for the June, 1951 issue. In Part III of *The Genesis of FMF Doctrine*, W. H. Russell cites the utter impracticability of Upton's drill and tactics in battle. Again I quote, "Upton required absolute combat control by a company commander, who gave all firing orders to men in rigidly dressed lines. His squad unit (two ranks of four) always changed front by wheeling, never marching to the rear."

Russell further recounts the clumsiness of Upton's tactics in battle by the necessity to centralize control, the rigidity of formations based on units of four, dressed lines and complete dependence upon movement "by the numbers." This permitted little or no initiative or sense of responsibility among junior officers and NCOs. Fundamentally, infantry drill is the basis of tactics. The organization of squads, platoons and companies being the same for parade ground as for battle field.

Mahan proposed an entirely new set of formations for drill and tactics based on a pyramid of threes; a section of three men and an NCO, three sections a squad, three squads a platoon and so on—the triangular structure which took so long to win out over hidebound proponents of the "good old square" structure. In short, continuous repetition of red-coats versus minute-men. In regard to the claim that our NCO leadership has suffered by the infantry drill of the past 15 years, let's consider Russell's statement on the effect of Mahan's tactics: "Not only did it mean changing certain customary drills, it imposed a real burden on petty officers and demanded men in the best physical condition who would display initiative."


Our current infantry drill and

structure of squad and platoon is simple, effective, smart and precise. Witness any drill instructor worth his salt handling a graduating boot platoon and I'll wager my stripes on the admiration and respect felt by any other Marine NCO. Observe any veteran platoon in the FMF running through combat formations over practice terrain or under fire and you'll find all of the command presence with subsequent obedience and discipline claimed to have been lost by the adoption of the new infantry drill.

Now let's get down to real cases. I will be among the first to deplore the sad state of some of our garrison troops. We have descended to new lows in snap, precision and, above all, mental alertness. Squad, platoon and company composition is not the same from one formation to the next. In any headquarters command there are always so many exempted from formations that it is impossible to develop any continuity in training or unity of organization. Unlike FMF formations, a company or battalion formation never has the same officers, the same NCOs or even the same men in ranks from one formation to the next. Snap and precision in drill demands continual practice by the same people day after day. Revival of an old, complex drill is not going to solve the problem when too little time is devoted to an existing simplified drill.

Ships' Detachments, outstanding recruit platoons and guard companies have always been able to put on flashy exhibition or ceremonial drill when the occasion demanded, but replacing with complex methods a simple system that only needs conscientious application is only compounding confusion. Let's go forward, not backward.

USMC



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A LOOK AT OUR AWARDS

Let's get back to the intended high values of our awards for gallantry and heroism in action

Are many of our medals and decorations losing their true value—does their criteria need to be analyzed and re-defined?

There are many pros and cons on the subject—some are satisfied with our present standard while there are those who believe that our entire group of medals and decorations as well as the system that awards them could be redefined and improved.

The one big gripe seems to be that a lot of company and battalion commanders have received Silver Stars and Navy Crosses just because they were the COs and not because

of any personal gallantry or extraordinary heroism on their part.

Now this may be true in some cases, but it certainly can't be considered a general occurrence. Also, a unit is normally only as good as its leader. Everyone in the unit can't be decorated, so, in many cases, it is considered fitting to decorate the CO on behalf of the unit. True, in such event, it would seem more fitting to award the Bronze Star or the Legion of Merit rather than the Silver Star or Navy Cross. However, if we check into a few cases we find that the citation indi-

By LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr.

cates gallantry in action (Silver Star) or extraordinary heroism (Navy Cross) on the part of the individual, incident to the leadership of the unit in a particular action—not simply meritorious achievement (Bronze Star) or exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service (Legion of Merit).

In connection with this, another point of contention is that of citation writing. If you've got a good writer who knows how to compose citations, practically any recommendation for any award will get approved. If you haven't got a good writer, a number of your recommendations will be disapproved or down graded. Also, a good writer can develop a situation or action into whatever he is told to write it for—either a citation for a Bronze Star or Silver Star, a Legion of Merit or Navy Cross.

As the Navy Board of Awards has said, a recommendation is reviewed on the basis of the citation and attendant documents as they are submitted, so that, if there is misrepresentation, the fault lies right back with the originator. If he is going to warp the regulations to suit his ends, no system will correct him. Whether because of this or not, Silver Stars and Navy Crosses awarded to officers generally don't carry as high a value as those awarded to enlisted personnel.


To put it another way, hardly anyone can deny the fact that we have more regard for these awards worn by enlisted men than we do when worn by officers. You know yourself that you've heard of situations where awards to officers were

misrepresented. For example, I've heard some officers say that if they had been Major Blank at Hill "X" they would have refused the award he got.

But neither he nor anyone else is going to refuse an award. The rea-

recognition to this distinction? Any way, say the ordnance men at a future date earns a Bronze Star for heroic action in combat and is thereby entitled to wear a gold star and combat "V" on his Bronze Star ribbon; — for all practicable purposes,

to furnish recognition for the team but how many times has a battalion been separately cited under either of these. Very few, and I sincerely doubt if any unit below the battalion level has ever been cited. What we need is a "valorous Unit Cita-



sons are fairly obvious. In the first place, it would mean turning down a desirable credit to one's personal record and in the second place, it would mean a personal affront to the recommending senior officer.

We could eliminate a number of such inequitable awards if we simply required the person recommended to certify the citation as factually true. This would place the responsibility directly on the person recommended. It wouldn't be a case of the recommending officer presenting an award to fulfill his desire of rewarding a subordinate.

In other words, the person recommended wouldn't be able to say simply, "The Colonel recommended me, so I took it." He would also have his honor at stake among his contemporaries and subordinates who were there at the time, because he would be certifying that the citation was factually true. Thus, if the citation was not certified, it would have to be rewritten for a more appropriate award.

What about the Bronze Star? The "neither nor" medal.

It ought to be called the Middle Class Medal or Legion of Merit Lower Class. How can a man who wears it for heroic action have the feeling of pride that should go with it? The contemptuous feeling for the Bronze Star, as it is presently awarded, is shared by practically everyone. One man gets a Bronze Star for doing a good job with small arms ordnance repair, while another man earns a Bronze Star by leading an assault on an enemy machine gun position. Sure, the man who earns his in combat can wear the combat "V," but how many people give much

as far as his contemporaries are concerned, he has earned two Bronze Stars for heroic action in combat. There are several ways we could correct these inequities.

First, make the Bronze Star a medal for heroic action in combat only. Even the name implies it. There are many who received the Bronze Star immediately after its adoption who felt that, had there been no Bronze Star medal, they would have received either the Silver Star or Legion of Merit. It is now generally acknowledged that the need exists for the Bronze Star as a combat award for a lesser degree of heroism than the Silver Star. Second, provide a suitable award "for meritorious achievement or service" to replace the Bronze Star now so awarded. In effect, it will be a "junior" Legion of Merit. Call it, say, a "Meritorious Medal." We would then have a suitable and significant award for meritorious achievement to a lesser degree than that for a Legion of Merit.

There are many who think we already have a "junior" Legion of Merit in the Letter of Commendation.

To a certain extent that is true, but the Letter of Commendation should remain in its present category "for excellent service" to meet the requirement for such a reward for all ranks.

So far, this has been about personal decorations — and that's our biggest weakness. We are looking for recognition of the individual and forgetting to recognize the team and all its members. The Navy Unit Citation and the Presidential Unit Citation, are supposed

tion" with appropriate ribbon and "action" stars to be awarded to every man in a unit of fire team to company size which is cited for a specific action. We would then have the means for giving recognition to all members of the team.


For example, here is a case which has happened. Sergeant Smith led his squad on a combat patrol. They engaged and routed an enemy patrol. The squad functioned and fought as a team under the leadership of Sergeant Smith. Sergeant Smith said he couldn't honestly recommend any one man for a medal because there was no singularly outstanding action. Sergeant Smith, however, was recommended for and later received the Bronze Star, principally by virtue of two statements from squad members as to his leadership during the engagement. Sergeant Smith, unofficially, said he didn't think he should get the medal and didn't like to accept it because he didn't do anymore than any other man in the squad and if he was to get a medal, they should all get one too. Sergeant Smith was the leader and the squad probably fought well because it was well trained and well led — we can't recommend everyone. Here we have the smallest echelon normally in a separate action and yet there were 12 men who received no award for an exemplary action, simply because they weren't the squad leader and they had such good team work that no one individual stood out.

Another example: Fox Company made a limited objective attack and secured the objective after a bitter fight. Recommendations for awards were processed and approved, but, as usual and unavoidable, many deserved

ing men were unnoticed and were not recommended. Yet, it was a bitter fight and the company objective was secured. But no theater battle star was awarded for this "minor" engagement. If we had a "Valorous Unit Citation," this void would be

to be a cut off somewhere, and it should be at company level, otherwise its purpose would be defeated. Anyway, the Navy and Presidential Unit Citations are supposed to be used for the higher echelons. This "Valorous Unit Citation" would

relatively no value or significance? It's gotten to the point where if a man has been in the service since World War II and wears less than four rows of ribbons he isn't given second notice, unless he wears the Medal of Honor. For example, why



filled. Think of the spirit all small units would build up in gaining such an award. It would also encourage a more judicious awarding of decorations to individuals.

What if a unit gets two or more of these "Valorous Unit Citations?"

Let me answer that by another case. Say the 1st Squad, 2d Platoon of Easy Company defends an outpost against a heavy enemy attack. All but one man in the squad is a casualty. However, they hold the outpost throughout the night until relieved at dawn. This squad is recommended and receives the "Valorous Unit Citation" ribbon with "action" star. Later in the week the 2d Platoon, Easy Company executed a raid on an enemy outpost. This raid was considered to be executed in an outstanding manner, since the platoon received only half a dozen casualties while killing 15 enemy and capturing a prisoner. For this action, the 2d Platoon receives the "Valorous Unit Citation." All members of the 2d Platoon in that action are entitled to wear the Valorous Unit Citation ribbon with "action" star. The 1st Squad members who took part in both actions now wear two bronze "action" stars on their Valorous Unit Citation ribbon. Therefore, at the end of a long campaign a man—a fighting man—may wear a Valorous Unit Citation ribbon with stars crediting him with each action in which he is a member of the unit cited, whether he be a member of a squad, platoon or company.

What's the matter with cutting the battalion in on it?

Because pretty soon higher rank would want to know why the regiment shouldn't be eligible. There has

make available a unit decoration that would mark the wearer as a member of a fighting unit in actual physical contact with the enemy. At the same time by reserving it for the lower echelons and ranks we would be giving infinitely more credit to the "fighting man" than is presently possible. It would be an enviable ribbon to wear.

Currently, we call the stars on our theater ribbons, "battle" stars; to avoid confusion, the stars for a "Valorous Unit Citation" ribbon could be called "action" stars.

Incidentally, "action" star is meant to denote just what it is. We all know that a "battle" star, as presently worn on a theater or campaign ribbon, simply indicates a man was in the general zone of operations during a specified period.

One man wears a "battle" star on a theater ribbon after truly qualifying for it by having been a member of a unit which was engaged with the enemy, while another man wears a "battle" star for the same period of operation having been a member of a unit which, at best, was in only remote danger.

A "battle" star should mean conflict with the enemy, not simply exposure to a possible enemy air raid or potential danger. It should be authorized only for those persons who are operating in a combat unit under battle conditions in the combat zone. Look at the thousands wearing "battle" stars on their Korean ribbon who enjoyed a soft life many miles from the front throughout their entire tour in Korea.

Speaking of theater and campaign ribbons—why do we authorize some such ribbons for wear that have

have two Korean ribbons? Yes, the answer is, one is the U. N. ribbon and the other is the Korean Service Ribbon. But for all practical purposes, as far as general significance is concerned, they are both ribbons for Korea. Another example, the Philippine Liberation Ribbon and the Philippine Independence Ribbon. If these are warranted, why not a French Liberation Ribbon or a Guam Liberation Ribbon? After all, consider the World War II theater ribbons. It was possible for a man to qualify for (not earn) three theater ribbons and yet not be authorized to wear a battle star on any of them. Under peace time or cold war conditions this may be warranted for such ribbons as the China Service Medal, the Occupation Medal and the Korean ribbon. However, during war time, a theater ribbon should not be authorized to be worn until a "battle" star has been earned as a part of the qualification for that ribbon.

The medal criteria we should definitely take some corrective action on, is the Purple Heart. It's probably a safe bet that at least 25 per cent of all Purple Heart recipients have not legitimately "sustained an injury as the result of enemy action which required treatment by a medical officer," as the Marine Corps Manual says. In the field, it seems all too often that phrase "requires treatment by a medical officer" is either overlooked or grossly misinterpreted. Recall to mind the many recipients who were merely scratched by one manner of means and received only first aid. I suppose the supposition could be that a scratch may become infected, therefore, it

requires the attention of a medical officer. For that matter, the medical officer in many cases is a medical corpsman. No matter what criteria we establish, if the spirit and intent are not adhered to when a medal is recommended, its value will be lowered. Another point about the Purple Heart: if a man breaks his leg when he falls while trying to take cover during an air raid, according to the phrase "sustains an injury as a result of enemy action," he is entitled to the Purple Heart. This is a gross injustice to the man who is awarded a Purple Heart for a wound caused by a shell fragment while securing Hill Able. Regardless of how a man gets his Purple Heart, public acknowledgment is that he received a wound inflicted by an enemy missile while engaged in combat with the enemy. All in all, we have a Purple Heart cheapened in significance and value. By changing the criteria for the Purple Heart to truly reflect the designation WIA, we would have a more worthy Purple Heart award. The Marine Corps Manual should read: . . . "sustains a would inflicted by an enemy weapon or missile which requires evacuation to the battalion aid station (or equivalent) for treatment by a medical officer."

One final point—the time it takes to prepare citations and get them approved before they can be presented. In a defensive situation, and of course, for awards for meritorious service, there is plenty of time to prepare citations. But, in a moving situation there just isn't sufficient time to handle this administration. As a result, many deserving cases are never submitted while most of the action is taking place. Platoon and company commanders don't have time to sit down and compile recommendations with citations until their situation is stabilized. By this time, which may be days or even weeks later, witnesses have been evacuated or killed and memories of remaining personnel have faded. In addition, the restricted delegation of authority for approval of awards, along with the resultant series of boards of awards which must review and pass on all recommendations, causes delays in final presentation which negates much of their value. Granted, delegation of this authority can be carried too far, so that

we might find one unit putting out a high percentage of awards and another unit a low percentage, depending on the inclination of the commanding officer. However, if the lower ranking awards could be delegated to the lower echelons for approval, the higher awards could receive the attention they deserve.

No one will dispute the fact that the top two awards, Medal of Honor and Navy Cross, should continue to be forwarded to Washington for final review and the Silver Star to Division level, as is presently done. But, there is no reason why the Bronze Stars can't receive final review and approval at regimental level and Letters of Commendation at battalion level. We would then see a marked speed-up in the presentation of these awards and they would probably be as well evaluated as now. As a check, a guide could be published, from time to time, indicating the number of these awards considered reasonable for type units under the existing situation. Also, higher echelon would undoubtedly monitor these awards.

As far as administration is concerned, the writing of citations could be alleviated to a marked degree by utilizing a "certificate" in lieu of a formal citation for the lower ranking awards of Bronze Star and Letter of Commendation. This "certificate" would present factual data only, no formal phraseology or descriptive adjectives. For example, "Private First Class John R. Jones, USMC, Automatic Rifleman, 1st Squad, 2d Platoon, Able Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, on 10 June, 1953 at 2000, alone successfully covered withdrawal of his squad from outpost "Jake" when attacked by overwhelming enemy force." This would give all the details necessary for recognition in the man's record and also the necessary reference data for official correlation.

In review, these are the points:

Let's get back to the intended high values of our awards for gallantry and heroism in action (Silver Star and Navy Cross) by making a clear distinction between these awards and those for performance of heroic or meritorious achievement and outstanding service (Bronze Star and Legion of Merit). In addition to present procedures, place responsibility on the person recommended

by having him certify as to the factual accuracy of his citation.

The Bronze Star should not be a middle class catch-all award for everything, as it is now. Give it the honorable position it deserves as a combat award, a "junior" Silver Star. Even the name implies it.

We need a "junior" Legion of Merit to replace the Bronze Star now awarded as such. An appropriate title would be "Meritorious Medal."

Originate a "small unit citation." We need such an award for presentation to all participants in a cited unit, up to and including company size. A distinctive ribbon, appropriately called the "Valorous Unit Citation," with "action" star for each action deserving a citation would be the answer for the teams—the men who really do the fighting.

"Battle Star" is a misnomer, as presently authorized for campaign and theater ribbons. This situation should be corrected by restricting it to those persons who are actually operating in a combat unit under battle conditions in the combat zone during the specified period.

We've gone overboard on theater, campaign, independence, liberation and U. N. ribbons. At least, let's avoid doubling up on these ribbons for the same or similar recognition. Also, during war time we should require that a "battle" star be earned before a person is authorized to wear the theater ribbon.

The Purple Heart does not reflect an award for a WIA. Let's give it back some of its intended value by requiring a man to qualify with a legitimate wound inflicted by an enemy weapon or missile, which requires evacuation to the battalion aid station (or equivalent) for treatment by a medical officer.

The time it takes from the day an award is indicated until the day it is presented, is far too long. This is because of having to write formal citations for the recommendations and because authority is not delegated to the lower echelons for awarding the lower ranking medals. Let's at least alleviate this by adopting a "certificate" in lieu of a formal citation for the Bronze Star and Letter of Commendation and by delegating authority to the Regiment and Battalion respectively for approval of these awards. USMC

in brief

The British have officially adopted a sub-machinegun capable of firing 540 rounds per minute. According to the British publication *Soldier*,



the L2A1 (above & right) will replace the Sten machine carbine. Weighing only six pounds (more than two pounds lighter than the Sten), the "Patchett gun" is only 18 inches long (with stock folded) and can be used almost as effectively as a rifle for bayonet fighting. The new weapon boasts of a smoother bolt action which, with the help of roller bearings, eases each round into the chamber from a 34-round magazine (the Sten had 28). It has an effective range of 200 yards and is reported to be much more accurate than the Sten.

The Marine Corps' newest all-flame tank (the T-67) incorporates a new type vaporizer (right) which ejects a raw gas and makes ignition simple. In addition, the new T-67 has a pressure tank capable of forcing flame fuel out to 300 yards for 90 seconds of sustained firing. The gunner can control the fuel mixture and can check the amount of fuel left in the tank by a timing gauge located in the turret.




President Eisenhower has recently signed an order that will double punishment of people going AWOL. Under the new order, effective the first of this month, a person being "over the hill" for 30 days or more can get a dishonorable discharge and a year in prison. The order also included many new provisions for forfeiture of pay.

The Commandant has granted staff NCOs the privilege of carrying swagger sticks. The new NCO symbol of rank and authority will be made available through cash sales supply storerooms.

Official approval has been given to a standard Marine Corps necktie for wear with civilian clothes. The new four-in-hand (below), which will be made in both silk and wool, was designed in a conservative color



scheme to match almost any combination of civilian clothing. It has a green background and narrow diagonal stripes of the traditional Marine Corps scarlet and gold. The tie will be made available to Marine Corps personnel through post exchanges in the near future.





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aly

He did spectacular things

By LtCol Frank O. Hough

“ANY OFFICER,” DAN DALY once said, “can get by on his sergeants. To be a sergeant, you have to know your stuff. I’d rather be an outstanding sergeant than just another officer.”

So GySgt Daniel Daly, USMC, turned down the proffered commission and retired eventually a sergeant major. And in his avowed ambition to be “an outstanding sergeant,” his was a career of rich fulfillment. In practically every respect he typified the highest type noncom of the old school. Yet, because he did spectacular things with a certain air, he came to be regarded as atypical: a sort of legendary figure in his own time.

“It was an object lesson to have served with him,” declared his old comrade in arms, the late MajGen Smedley D. Butler, who shared with Dan Daly the distinction of being one of the only three men in history to win Navy Medals of Honor twice. (The third: Lt John W. McCloy, USN. LtCol Louis Cukela, USMC, Ret., wears two Medals of Honor, but one of these is an Army award.)

But it is not because of those medals that Daly is remembered today. He lives on in American military tradition as the man who led a platoon in assault on German machine gun nests with the shout: “Come on, you sons of bitches! Do you want to live forever!”

That occurred at Belleau Wood in World War I and, because it seemed to illustrate a certain facet of American fighting spirit, was widely quoted as one of the most inspiring battle cries of all time.



with a certain flair . . . he became the Marine Corps' most outstanding NCO

Daly, essentially a modest man, denied with horror ever saying anything so uncouth, declaring that what he really yelled was something to the effect: "For gracious sake, you chaps, leave us charge the foe." In fact, nobody was ever able to pin him down all the way, and he finally settled for: "For Christ's sake, men, come on!"

But the public was accepting no substitutes. A rumor that the slogan actually originated during Pickett's charge at Gettysburg aroused the interest of the Confederacy's distinguished historian, the late Douglas Southall Freeman, to the extent of doing some research on the matter. He came up with nothing at all, so Dan Daly's niche in tradition appears secure.

He came back from France in 1919 probably the most decorated man in any branch of the service. As such, he clearly fitted the newspaper reporters' definition of "news," and they flocked around him.

"I got all these medals," he told them pointedly, "for minding my own damn business."

But reporters are persistent people, and Daly was not really an unreasonable man.

"I got my DSC at Belleau Wood," he admitted finally. "I was out there pickin' pansies for my girl in Brooklyn one day when all of a sudden a car drove up loaded with brass hats. One of the officers said, 'Hey! lookout the Marine pickin' flowers. Let's give the poor guy a medal.' Well, sir, they pinned the DSC on me before I could stop 'em."

Actually he received it for the SOB incident. As first sergeant of the 73d Company, 6th Marines, he took in hand a pinned-down platoon and led it in frontal assault against strongly prepared machine gun positions, and on successful completion of the mission returned to carry in his wounded under heavy fire. He was himself wounded later in that operation and twice again at Blanc Mont. The Navy subsequently awarded him the Navy Cross, and the French chipped in with the *Medaille Militaire* and *Croix de*

Guerre with palm.

He received his first Medal of Honor in Pekin during the Boxer Rebellion for volunteering to hold a vital position single-handed while an officer went back for reinforcements. In reporting the incident in detail, Major Newt H. Hall concluded his citation: ". . . I respectfully invite the attention of the commanding officer to the courage and fidelity of Daniel Daly, private, U. S. Marine Corps, at all times, and to his conduct on the night of the 15th of July, 1900. . ."

His second came in 1915 when he was a gunnery sergeant in Haiti. The exact circumstances remain obscure because legend becomes entangled with the facts set forth in his citation. In any event, his exploits had to do with extricating a 35-man patrol that had been ambushed by 400 bandits, and the subsequent capture of a Caco stronghold.

These colorful events tend to overshadow the fact that Dan Daly possessed a great deal more than reckless courage in combat. The greater part of his long and useful service career passed wholly without heroics, as he rose step by step to become one of the most efficient and respected non-commissioned officers in the Marine Corps. Persons who knew him describe him as a strict disciplinarian who demanded and got complete obedience from his men; a stickler for spit'n polish where appropriate, and for immaculate weapons at all times. That such a man should be popular as well as respected owes to a tough-grained fair mindedness and a never slackened vigilance to protect the rights and promote the welfare of those under him.

His career ran the gamut of activities of the closely knit Marine Corps of his era: tours of routine duty interspersed with small wars and one big one. In addition to China, Haiti and France, his foreign service included expeditionary duty in Panama, Cuba and Mexico. He put in a tour on recruiting and missed few, if any, Stateside posts and stations. As a seagoing Marine he served in

the ships detachments of seven Naval vessels. While on this duty in 1911 he received letters of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy and the Major General Commandant for his conduct in putting out a fire aboard USS *Springfield* at great personal risk.

Dan Daly first enlisted in January, 1899 at the age of 25, and thereafter shipped over regularly at four-year intervals. He made corporal in 1906, sergeant in 1909, gunnery sergeant in 1915, first sergeant in 1917, sergeant major in 1920. Physically he was on the smallish side, but his erect carriage minimized this. His height has been variously estimated as 5'5½" to 5'7", and his weight ran consistently in the 130s: a tough, wiry man who had been a fighter of some note in his younger days, with hard gray-blue eyes that bored through a man when the occasion required.

Daly never married. "Life in the Corps isn't so bad—after you get the hang of things," he observed back in 1919. "I can't see how a single man could spend his time better than in the Marines."

But he was 45 years old when he returned from France, with 20 years service behind him. Though he was of the stuff of which real heroes are made, he had small taste for being a newspaper hero. And perhaps he had a natural reluctance to continue his career in the Corps in which he had already become a living legend. In any case, the Major General Commandant acceded to his request in July, 1920 and placed him on inactive status in the Fleet Reserve to serve out his "30" to retirement.

Thus Sergeant Major Dan Daly sank into the welcome anonymity of civilian life. He emerged briefly into the news again upon his retirement in 1929, upon his death in 1937 and when the Navy named a destroyer in his honor in 1942. But the Dan Daly of China, Haiti and France will remain part and parcel of our tradition as long as the Marine Corps contains any SOBs who want to live forever.

USMC



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Members of the Marine Corps Association

Subj: Commandant's Birthday Message — 10 November 1954

November 10, 1954, marks the 179th year in which Marines have made a substantial contribution to the security of our country. Each year that great heritage of service and accomplishment grows in stature as a result of the courage, the resolution and the selfless loyalty of Marines of all ranks. As in years past this anniversary is an occasion for reaffirming our pride in the achievements of Marines in peace and war since the days of our Nation's birth.

The magnificent record which has been built over a period of almost two centuries is best measured in terms of the skill and the readiness of our Marine fighting forces, and today, more than in any era of the past, the Marine Corps must stand ready to discharge its mission as a professional fighting force prepared to meet any emergency at the moment it occurs. The grave tensions that pull at the slender threads of peace woven by the Free Nations of the world are a continuing challenge to all Marines to work side by side as a team, in a daily effort to become stronger, more effective and more fully prepared to meet our many obligations. If we are to realize our great capabilities and apply them to the fullest advantage of our Country we must face each problem with the same application and devotion to duty that has characterized the actions of our predecessors in the Corps since 1775. It is in the example set by those Marines of other generations that we find the inspiration and courage to meet our new responsibilities, — however great they may be.

I am proud of the performance of every Marine in fulfilling our obligations during the past year. Our field forces, stationed in every corner of the globe, have measured up admirably to the many pressing requirements which they have encountered. Our supporting forces have performed their exacting duties with efficiency and economy. The entire Corps, thanks to the efforts of every Marine, officer and enlisted, Regular and Reserve, is in excellent condition. It is therefore with a sense of deep gratitude in your past accomplishments, and of complete confidence in your capability to meet the challenges of the future, that I extend my personal best wishes to all Marines on this happy occasion, the 179th Birthday of our beloved Corps.

LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
General, U. S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Sergeant's Sword

..... a symbol
sheathed in
honor


Text and illustrations

by

Maj John H. Magruder, III



THROUGHOUT MOST OF RECORDED time the sword has been the symbol of the soldier's calling. With this weapon our early ancestors carved out their notches in history. As the evolution of modern arms progressed from the bow and arrow through the age of gunpowder and the subsequent development of the fire arm, the sword's actual employment as a weapon was gradually relegated to a secondary role. Finally, the matur-



NOMENCLATURE OF THE SWORD AND SCABBARD

J. H. MAGRUDER, III, MAJ, USMCR



Present day Marine NCO Sabre is nearly identical to the model officers carried in the Civil War

ing of the repeating military rifle in the latter half of the 19th Century all but banished this ancient mark of the warrior from the battle field and consigned it to purely ceremonial use on the parade ground.

The exigencies of modern warfare have not, however, detracted from the position which the sword occupies as the badge of the military man. As the oldest form of weapon still in use, it has come to symbolize martial leadership. Those who carry it must bear the burden of continuing the heritage which has been passed down through the pages of history by the men who once used their blades in earnest.

In this respect, the non-commissioned officers of the Marine Corps have several distinctions of which they can be justly proud. They are the only non-commissioned officers in any branch of the regular United States Armed Forces who still have the privilege of carrying swords. (Certain units of the National Guard still authorize NCO swords for ceremonial use when wearing the distinctive uniform of the regiment. Among these are the 182nd Inf Regt [The New Haven Greys], the 107th Inf Regt [7th N. Y.], 176th Inf Regt [1st Virginia] and 103rd Reconnaiss-

sance Co. [1st City Troop of Philadelphia], to name only a few.) In addition, they have the unique position of being the only NCOs ever authorized to carry what is basically a commissioned officer's weapon.

The present day sword issued to the noncoms of the Corps was originally adopted by the War Department on April 9th, 1850 as the regulation saber for the foot officers of the Infantry. Based upon a French design, it was a well balanced, serviceable weapon. The single edged, ornately etched blade had very little curve and appeared to be nearly straight. A false edge ran back nine inches from the point, while a wide fuller reached from the ricasso to the beginning of the false edge, and a narrow fuller extended above the broad one and was about five inches shorter. Wooden grips were covered with fish skin wrapped with twisted gilt wire and the pommel, designed after a Phrygian helmet, was decorated with floral sprays. The gilded brass guard was of the half-basket design. The weapon was sheathed in a scabbard of black leather with gilded brass fittings.

In 1859, just prior to the Civil War, the commissioned officers of the Marine Corps had adopted the

Model 1850 foot officers' sword. They found it more serviceable than their lighter, Mameluke-type saber and particularly welcomed its leather scabbard which was not subject to the many dents their former brass scabbards had been forever acquiring in the hustle and bustle of close life aboard ship.

Following the War between the States, however, the repeating military rifle made rapid developments, redesigning the battle fields of the world and sounding the death knell of the sword which was thenceforth looked upon as being more of an encumbrance than an asset in the field.

Prodded by a desire to reinstate the traditional weapon of their predecessors, especially since its purpose had become more symbolic than utilitarian, Marine officers reverted to their Mameluke sword in 1875 when the Corps entered its so-called "Golden Era" of sartorial splendor. At this time, Marine noncoms acquired the arm being discarded by their commissioned brothers-in-arms. It is this same weapon, with only minor alterations, which is still carried in Marine parade formations by the senior NCOs of the Corps.

Without doubt, the adoption of the 1850 officers' sword by the Marine non-commissioned officers was prompted by two important considerations. First, the "Golden Era" was a period when gold braid, dazzling hat plumes and refurbished ornaments predominated on the military uniform. Elegant styles were being set by the army of Napoleon III of France, which was still, though not for long, the foremost exponent of military fashion on the continent of Europe. Thus, enlisted personnel as well as officers were to be decked out in the showiest accoutrements possible. Certainly their new sword fit the bill. Secondly, at the close of the Civil War, many surplus weapons were on hand in the nation's armories, so by adapting the dressy infantry officers' sword to the NCOs of the Corps, good use could be made of excess materials. But it was also a gesture of considerable respect to the Marine noncom, for never before had a badge so symbolic of the commissioned officer been turned over to the non-commissioned ranks.

At first glance, the Marine NCO sword in use from 1875 till 1934 was no different than the 1850 officers' model. Only the fish skin covering on the grip had been replaced by black leather and the letters "U.S.M.C." etched on the reverse side of the blade instead of the "U.S." which had appeared on the officers' arm. Issue numbers were normally stamped on the counter-guard above the grips and most scabbards bore a frog stud instead of carrying rings, since all but the sergeants major and quartermaster sergeants wore their swords suspended from a frog attached to their waist belts. The senior NCOs carried their sidearms on slings similar to those used by commissioned officers and a limited number of swords were equipped with rings for their use. After the first pay grade was established in 1937, all noncoms in this grade were authorized to carry their swords on slings until 1948 when regulations provided that all NCOs, regardless of rank, adopt the frog.

In 1934, revised regulations called for a slightly more slender blade which eliminated the narrow fuller and new decorative etching including the inscription "United States Marines." Otherwise, it remained identical to the Civil War officers' model, albeit a lighter, somewhat less serviceable version.

The commissioned and noncommissioned officers now retain the saber for what it implies to their profession rather than for the use that it offers. Their primary duty is to lead, not to shoot. The sword thus continues as the personification of military tradition and has been entrusted to those most responsible for maintaining it. Except for the famous Mameluke hilted sword of Marine commissioned officers, adopted in 1826, the Marine NCO sword rates as the oldest weapon in American arms still in use.


It is an important emblem. In the days of the "Old Corps," when advancement was slow, the senior noncoms represented many years of service and their position in the Corps carried great prestige. In the barracks their prerogatives were unquestioned. Their right to carry the sword was a privilege that, in the eyes of the lower ranks, personified the august position to which they had attained.



Marine 1st Sergeant — 1875

While its use is now limited by regulations to "when in charge of troops on ceremonial occasions," the sword is part of that intangible "esprit de corps" which makes the Marine of today part of that long, honored muster roll on which will always be found names like Sergeant Major Dan Daly, Sergeant Major John H. Quick and Master Gunnery Sergeant Leland Diamond. The sword of today may be just a symbol, but it is a proud one worthy of keeping as a part of the Marine tradition which will serve as a vital incentive to the Leathernecks of tomorrow.

USMC



By Joel D. Thacker and Michael O'Quinlivan

Anniversary

as the past and the future fused with the present — that day the "force-in-readiness" was born

Navy "fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunition and provisions at Continental expense . . . with soldiers who have been bred to the sea"; or, it could have been 5 October, 1775 when Congress directed General Washington to secure two vessels and to give orders for the "proper encouragement to the Marines and Seamen" serving in them; or, it could have been 13 October, 1775 when Congress directed that two vessels be fitted out, the first to have 80 men, including Marines. Perhaps a review of the historical background will give us an insight into why 10 November, 1775 was selected.

The concept of Marines was not strange to the men who sat in the Continental Congress and directed the fortunes, both civil and military, of the American colonies during the Revolution. Nor was the concept of the military uses in which Marines excelled unknown to those revolutionary leaders. The Pilgrims were settled in Massachusetts a little over 30 years when, in 1654 a small fleet and army of the English colonists went off to Port Royal, the French stronghold in Nova Scotia, and destroyed that base of hostile operations against the New England fishing and trading fleets. In the next 50 years or so, expeditions to Port Royal were one of the favorite outdoor sports of the New England colonists and no fewer than 11 attempts, some successful and others unsuccessful, were undertaken until, in 1710, a combined British and American force captured and held

the place finally for the English Crown. Hardly was Port Royal out of the way when the French set up, in 1713, another threat to the safety of New England in the fortress established at Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island. At the first opportunity, the New England colonists were quick to attack Louisbourg. Under the doughty William Pepperell of Maine, an army of 4,000 men gathered from Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine wrested Louisbourg from the French (Aug. GAZETTE).

In the meantime, another operation involving the American colonists took place in the Caribbean. This time it was the settlers of the Middle and Southern colonies who teamed with the British, and now it was the Spanish who were to be on the receiving end of an amphibious attack. In 1739, the British were

carrying on some private hostilities with Spain which were euphemistically known as the War of Jenkins' Ear. It was at this time that the British government decided to launch an attack on the Spanish stronghold of Cartagena, in what is now Colombia, and at the same time to rejuvenate its Marine regiments which had been allowed to fall into disuse. With an eye on the already exhibited prowess of the American colonists in such matters, London decided to make good use of the Americans in the new Marine establishment. Accordingly, in 1740 the order went out to Governor Spottswoode of Virginia to raise three Marine regiments in America to rank as regiments of the British line on a footing with the six regiments of Marines being raised in England. Before all the arrangements could be made Spottswoode died and the





Marines, 1775 — "Don't tread on me" came before "Semper Fidelis"

leadership passed to his deputy, Lieutenant Governor Gooch of Virginia. In the final analysis "Gooch's Marines" were not three regiments, but one regiment consisting of four battalions and ranking in the British Army list as the 43d Regiment.

The attempt on Cartagena failed and the fleet which sailed away from South America carried considerably less than half the North American Colonial Marines who set forth under Col Gooch's command. Lest any opprobrium be heaped on the American Marines in this fiasco of British arms, Tobias Smollett, who performed the service of a "war correspondent" with the expedition, had nothing but praise for Gooch's men who, although already decimated by heat and disease, carried the attacks to the Spanish forts and were literally beat on the head by cannon balls which came point blank from the low-angled Spanish guns.

Military defeat or not, the Cartagena expedition made a tremendous impression on the Americans; witness the names of "Cartagena" and "Porto Bello" among the estates of veterans of the campaign and the name of "Mount Vernon" given to the estate of Lawrence Washington in honor of the British Admiral under whom he had served as a captain in Gooch's Marines at Cartagena.

All this is admittedly an oversimplification of the very complex aspect of American colonial military history, and by no means takes into account all of the military undertakings of the colonists which were of an amphibious nature. Never-

theless, it does serve to point up the very real fact that Marines and amphibious operations were as much a part of the colonial tradition as the devotion to personal liberty. It is little wonder then that, less than a month after the outbreak at Lexington and Concord of a shooting war between England and the American Colonies, the pay roll of the sloop *Enterprise* carried as "Marines" the names of a lieutenant, two sergeants and 15 privates. The earliest date of assignment of these men is 3 May, 1775 and since they technically belonged to Arnold's command which was raised in Massachusetts, that colony again took the lead in employing as part of its military forces, men who were to act both as soldiers and as sailors—Marines.

After George Washington, brother of the Lawrence Washington of Cartagena fame, had taken command of the Continental Army at Boston in July, 1775, the Colonies found themselves in much the same relationship to the British-held eastern part of Canada as the New Englanders had found themselves when the French held that strategic part of the world. With a powerful British navy and hostile Canadians in the vicinity, the whole northeastern segment of the colonies was in immediate danger. Moreover, it was known that at Halifax, Nova Scotia there were large supplies of war materials, resources sorely needed by the embattled colonies. Consequently, on 10 November, the Continental Congress reached a momentous decision and passed resolutions to the effect that agents be sent to investigate the possibilities of an amphibious operation against the port.

Following hard upon the heels of the decision to undertake an amphibious expedition if and when practicable, the Continental Congress took steps to implement the resolves with a further resolution:

"... That two Battalions of Marines be raised consisting of one Colonel, two lieutenant Colonels, two Majors & officers as usual in other regiments, that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken that no persons be

Princeton, 1777 — Marines were in on the kill



Bettmann

appointed to office or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, when required. That they be enlisted and commissioned to serve for and during the present war between Great Britain and the Colonies unless dismissed by order to Congress; That they be distinguished by the names of the First & Second Battalions of American Marines, and that they be considered as part of the number, which the Continental Army before Boston is ordered to consist of." [sic]

The plan to raise the two Marine Battalions from Washington's Army



Bettmann

Governor Spottiswoode

was quickly scotched by Washington himself who informed the Congress in no uncertain terms that, although he was wholly sympathetic to the idea of having Marines, he could not spare any men from his forces for the two battalions which had been authorized. Accordingly, Congress resolved on 30 November, 1775 that "the two battalions of Marines be raised independent of the Army already ordered for the service in Massachusetts bay." Two days prior to this John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, had signed the commission of Captain of Marines for Samuel Nicholas. As the senior officer of the new establishment it was the duty of Nicholas to organize and command, what from the very beginning amounted to an independent branch of the Continental service consisting of men who were to be part soldier and part sailor and who were to cooperate equally with the Army and the Navy.

A small book could be written about the exploits and accomplish-

ments of the Continental Marines from the time that Captain Nicholas set up his headquarters in 1775 at Philadelphia until the last Marine was discharged in 1783. The story would begin with Robert Mulvan who was made a Captain of Marines and who used his popular Tun Tavern as the first recruiting rendezvous. It would tell of the recruiting parties who paraded through the streets of Philadelphia literally "beating the drum" for enlistments. It would tell of the earliest Marine emblem of a coiled rattlesnake and the words "Don't tread on me" being mistaken for the national symbol of the new United States by no less a personage than Benjamin Franklin. It would tell of the first landing on foreign soil by forces of the United States when Captain Nicholas led his Marines ashore in the Bahamas in March, 1776 to capture the war material there. It would tell of the service of the Marines with the Army at the two Battles of Trenton and the Battle of Princeton in 1777. It would tell of the gallant landing of the Marines under John Paul Jones in 1778 at Whitehaven, England, one of the few occasions of history that sacrosanct island has been invaded by hostile intruders. And it would tell of the miserable failure of the Americans in 1779 to recapture the Penobscot Bay region.

The story could go on and on. But so far as the history of the 10th of November, 1775 is concerned, two salient features catch the eye: it was a date in American history when the past and the future met in the present. The past provided a frame of reference within which the Continental Congress could act—there had been from time immemorial in the American colonies the tradition of sea-soldiers, of even an independent organization of Marines in the Cartagena expedition, and there was no reason why the American colonies should not have their Marines also.

The Continental Congress rose to the occasion and on one and the same day resolved not only to beard the British lion in his Nova Scotian den, but also to recognize a force which would be most capable of accomplishing this mission which would have to be carried out by land and by sea. The expedition to Nova




Lejeune: "It is fitting that we who are Marines should commemorate . . ."

Scotia never materialized. Neither did the plan for two full battalions of Marines. But amphibious operations were carried out during the Revolution and there were Marines on hand for every one of them.

The resolutions of Congress of 5, 13, and 30 October, 1775 provided Marines for the warships of the Continental Navy, but the historic resolution of 10 November, 1775 brought into being a specific organization of Continental Marines, a "force in readiness" for special missions with either the Army or Navy—or alone. Since the Marines' amphibious warfare and the "force in readiness" concept have been inseparable ever since, it is only fitting and proper that US Marines should annually celebrate the 10th of November.

USMC



By Maj J. L. Tobin

RECENTLY, I REQUESTED COMMENT by a Marine Corps general upon a question I put to him at the conclusion of an address he gave to the assembled students of the Junior and Senior Schools at Quantico.

The question was in effect as follows: "General, a word which I detest has, of recent years, gained more and more usage in the Marine Corps. That word is 'morale.' I feel that the term is foreign to the Marine Corps' traditional concept of esprit de corps, since Marine units are properly measured in level of discipline and status of training. Would the General please comment on his estimate as to when the present tendency to soldier under union conditions will disappear and the Corps return to its true professional outlook?"

The general's answer was given with feeling and in some length. It provided inspiration to the entire audience.

Since that date, however, I have been brought to task by a number of my fellow officers to explain my concern and reasoning in taking such violent issue with a legitimate word. They argue that we must learn to live with it because it is here to stay and they hold that whether or not we accept it is of little consequence. I disagree.

It is true that the dictionary defi-

nition of "morale" is innoxious enough. It reads: "morale: condition as affected by, or dependent upon, such morale or mental factors as zeal, spirit, hope, confidence, etc.; mental state as of an army." I take no issue with these listed morale or mental factors. My abhorrence of the word is predicated upon the connotations it has gradually assumed during the past dozen years.

The expressions "high morale" and "low morale" have been seen and heard innumerable times in the news media. Their possession by units and individuals in the armed services has received great weight of attention by Congressional investigation, newspaper survey and parental concern. These influences have distorted their basic meaning until the yardstick of their measurement is now calibrated in degrees of "contentment." In this manner non-professional opinion has become an erroneous criterion for military character and leadership.

"High morale" attributed to an army or any military unit should properly depict its ability and willingness to engage in battle. A brilliant example of the true measurement of military character was displayed by General McAuliffe's 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne in World War II. The troops of this unit, when surrounded and hope-

lessly outnumbered, received a demand to surrender. Their one-word answer, "Nuts" carved out for them an honored niche in the annals of military tradition. The answer also precludes any necessity for a lengthy description of their fighting qualities. They were soldiers.

Despite such sterling examples of what constitutes true military integrity by the 101st in World War II, and by the 1st Marine Division in its "Retreat Hell" withdrawal from the Chosin reservoir through hordes of Chinese Reds in Korea, the abuse of the term "morale" continues. Why?

I attribute it to the feeling of aversion to military service held by the people of this nation. The regimentation and strictness of discipline demanded in the military is regarded as alien to the freedoms inherent to our way of life. Individuals called upon to fill the ranks of military units are regarded as "unfortunate." This attitude has created an air of sympathetic understanding in which a "morale approach" has been built up to make the ordeal as painless as possible.

What is lacking is a realization of the great need today for dedicated young men ready to effectively fight in the defense of our country. It is true that if there were one world living under our code of

ethics, the Christian democratic way of life, the need for the profession of arms would not exist.

In the face of this danger to our treasured freedoms this nation must maintain the means to protect itself. That means lies in its military might, which is in turn, dependent upon the successfulness of the training of the individual service man in the soldierly virtues. There is no "easy way" of becoming a soldier.

The "morale approach" which has become associated with military training and service, denies the concept of duty to country which is the rock foundation for the existence of military forces. It forgets that to serve this nation in time of war or period of national emergency is a grave responsibility and a great privilege. It forsakes acknowledgement of the fact that a military unit, to gain the integrity of combat readiness, must demand of its members that they engage in arduous training and that they willingly give a measure of self-sacrifice.

History illustrates that many powerful nations have fallen to an invader by failing to produce a sufficient number of warriors ready to endure all if necessary for "duty, honor, country." The mighty Roman Empire was overrun by a barbarian horde when its once invincible legions succumbed to the desire to embrace the ease of existence enjoyed by a fortunate populace.

The United States of America is confronted today by a similar threat — the Red menace. This newest invader, now called an aggressor, includes in its forces millions of tough, "backward" Asiatic troops. In order for this nation to survive in the event of an attack, these troops must be faced and defeated in the far reaches of the world. They must be outfought in the distant mountains and jungles, in the extreme cold and the sub-tropic heat. Recent and current history in Korea and Indochina proves that they are indeed tough, and that they demand tougher units to defeat them.

The fact must be granted that the adapting of Asiatic troops to rugged fighting conditions is greatly simplified by their accustomed mode of living. However, this nation must realize that we have by far the most to lose in a failure on our part to

adapt ourselves to unpleasant training methods.

Exhaustive efforts to make service life as comfortable as possible are certainly not evils in themselves, nor undesirable, but if they are attained or aspired to as a measure of achievement at the price of discipline and state of training they deprive a military unit of its life's blood. A unit so afflicted does not suffer defeat in battle . . . it dies of anemia.

I contend that to compromise in our stand as professionals, in the struggle of discipline versus the adequacy of the supply of comic books, is dangerous to our beloved esprit de corps which is the essence of devotion to duty and the will to fight. I believe that a series of compromises will lead to the acceptance of the term "morale" as a substitute for the sacred expression that is the very soul of the United States Marine Corps. This must not occur. To do so would mean the embracing of all the fatal negativeness of the "morale approach."

I propose that among its weaknesses it embodies: the emphasis on the philosophy of "what is in it for me" . . . the identification with privilege, not accomplishment . . . the credence to the belief that mediocrity deserves unwarranted recognition . . . the mothering of the rally ground of the disgruntled, the whiners . . . the offering of a crutch, a convenient excuse to those that need one . . . the carrying, by leadership, onto the battlefield of the over reliance on supporting fires and road-boundness . . . the fostering of an attitude that bleats: "Wait! Wait! Wait! Ride to the objective."

The challenge has been made that I am being unrealistic in my arguments against a "mere word." I am informed that I am fighting what is in substance a national problem that demands solution on a much broader basis. It cannot be denied that an unhealthy percentage of this nation's manhood has become infected with several cancerous diseases, among them "Let George do it-ism" and "The world owes me a living-it-is." And, that it is becoming increasingly evident that these young men must be resold on the merits of their own form of government. It is also apparent that they must be guided to an acknowledgement of the responsibilities which are com-

mensurate with the privileges they enjoy.

However, the capacity of this nation to endure hardship, overcome adversity and give willing sacrifice in the defense of its ideals was born at Valley Forge. During our revolutionary period the strength of American institutions was molded by a breed of men who pledged their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor. Although surrounded by those of lesser fortitude, our founding fathers retained the courage of their convictions. They possessed a great capacity for leadership which enabled them to rally the weak at heart. It has been thus with men of deep convictions in all ages . . . "Do not send them away lest they faint on the way, for they are sheep without a shepherd" (Mark 6:34). Leadership has always provided the means of salvation.

Unfortunately, in the world today leadership is one commodity in very short supply and, because of this scarcity, principles are being compromised in favor of expediency. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain a clear cut opinion as to what is right or wrong; what is black or white. Thousands of shades of gray tint the roads of least resistance sought on every hand.

I refuse to concede to either any dilution of the Marine colors, or to any compromise with our fighting traditions, or to any tinting of our cherished esprit de corps with "morale." To yield is to deny the leadership, from the corporal's level up, that is the forte from which the Marine Corps takes its greatest measure of pride.


This leadership, salted with a contagion of spirit, is the legacy granted us by those Marines of the past whose heroic conduct has made the word Marine synonymous with honor, courage and faithfulness. To fail to instill in every Marine our heritage of devotion to duty is to break faith with our motto and to commit the gravest of crimes against our esprit de corps . . . the treason of letting another Marine down.

The United States Marine Corps' colors are a vivid scarlet and gold. Let us rise up beside them, keep faith with our professional creed, and without any equivocation proclaim . . . "This is what we hold to be sacred."

US MC



NCOs - A



PVT
15%

PFC
45 %

NCO
40%

1954
MARINE CORPS



By LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr.

WHEN RUDYARD KIPLING proclaimed, "The backbone o' the Army is the Noncommissioned Man!" he said a mouthful.

The first sergeant of a troop in the old 3d Cavalry said it in different words one morning to a new lieutenant. "You've been in the troop *nine* years, first sergeant?" the lieutenant had exclaimed. "Yes sir," came the reply, "the officers come and they go, but it don't hurt the troop."

The pre-1939 Marine Corps was also built around a select, iron core of NCOs who may not have read Kipling, but who would have known what the Yellow-legs first sergeant meant. These NCOs of yesterday won chevrons almost entirely because of leadership ability, with reluctant concession to the limited administrative or technical requirements of that older Marine Corps.

Thus the NCO problems of two decades past were basic, stemming as they did from human frailty, low pay and, from time to time, per-

sonality clashes or varying degrees of faulty leadership—crises which could be readily dealt with as they arose.

It never entered my head until November, 1941 (to date the occasion exactly) that other kinds of NCO problems could confront the Marine Corps. That such could indeed be the case came home with a shock one day at San Diego Recruit Depot, where the battalion to which I then belonged was outloading westward.

As the recruit platoons marched and countermarched, something wholly incredible swam before my eyes: a painfully left-footed platoon made up of staff sergeants being chivvied along by a corporal D.I. who was trying to teach these very odd staff sergeants the elementary marchings.

What a sight they were.

The platoon's greens were moth-flake-fresh and redolent of the clothing room. Garrison caps perched uncertainly, ready to topple off any minute. The dull factory finish still glowered through spotty layers of Kiwi on belts and shoes. The

plucked-chicken haircuts bespoke recruit bewilderment instead of NCO habit and austerity.

Now in point of fact these unhappy souls were a highly sought-after, even a crucial commodity in 1941's manpower market: newly enlisted technicians for the vintage radar just being whispered into service. As such, they had been enticed and blandished into a situation where they were desperately needed, and, in recognition of arcane skills, were being launched in the Corps as staff sergeants.

Whatever else they were that morning, chevrons to the contrary notwithstanding, those men were *not* noncommissioned officers. Indeed, they were just barely Marines.

A CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN



**1937
MARINE CORPS**



**PVT
55%**



**PFC
18%**



**NCO
27%**

eminent challenges of the hour come from within.

Directly and inextricably related to these challenges and the way we answer them, is the NCO situation.

What is today's NCO situation in the Marine Corps?

I

The gross manifestations of our NCO situation are three in number:

(1) Numerically (because the Corps is bigger)—but proportionately, too—we have many more non-commissioned officers than ever before in time of “peace.”

(2) A remarkable proportion of today's Marine NCOs—like my 1941 radar sergeants—must perform duties in which technical or administrative capability, rather than military leadership, receive first emphasis.

(3) Rapid expansion, Korean-war pressures and the climate of the times within the Armed Forces as a whole, have left their mark on individual standards of responsibility, leadership and discipline among all ranks, NCOs included.

“Who let *them* in?” I asked.

It was years later before I understood that those untried staff sergeants were a collective sign of the times. That the Marine Corps, unknowingly, was approaching a new era of noncommissioned officers. That the new NCO situation would beget challenges of scope and quality never before imagined. That, in fact, the priceless quality of the Corps would ultimately be sustained, at least partly, on the backs of many such new-style noncommissioned officers.


In this year 1954, the Corps, once again a hundred-per cent volunteer outfit, holds its solid place as a national institution. And after Korea, as after any hard war, the pre-

So much for the general picture—let's now consider the size and experience of our NCO population.

As I write (in the shadow of moderate 1954 cutbacks) there are approximately 88,000 noncommissioned officers in the Marine Corps. That is to say, slightly more than 40 per cent of the Corps hold NCO ratings and wear red stripes on their trousers. This is in sharp contrast with 1937 (a statistically typical pre-war year), when only 27 per cent of the Corps were rated men.

The base of service experience on which this new corps of NCOs must stand is, percentage-wise, thinner than in the past. In today's Marine Corps it would probably surprise you to see how few NCOs, relatively speaking, still display World War II campaign ribbons and battle stars. Indeed, a substantial number of non-commissioned officers in the junior pay-grades have service only during the period of the Korean War. This condition does find offset in two compensating factors, however:

(1) Extensive World War II and/or Korean combat experience, right



Korean combat boosted NCO maturity

down into company grades, of the preponderance of regular Marine officers.

(2) Wide distribution of recent Korean combat experience to a large number of noncommissioned officers; an NCO matures fast in combat, and about 50 per cent of all enlisted Marines in the Corps served in Korea. Looking at this experience professionally, however, we must remember that much of it was acquired in static, frequently defensive, land-warfare situations, and thus constitutes an asset at least slightly qualified by accompanying liabilities.

All in all, however, two facts stand out beyond argument:

First, the Marine Corps now has (and will continue to have) a higher ratio of NCOs to privates than it ever had before.

Second, it cannot be denied that, as of 1954, we have somewhat less collective service experience and long-service, professional maturity—as distinct from combat experience—for this enlarged corps of new noncommissioned officers to go on.

Now let's ask—what, in general, are we doing with all these rated men? How are they employed? Why do we need so many more NCOs, proportionately, in 1954 than we did in 1937?

When a noncommissioned officer's rise to promotion and pay depends on deft steps up an MOS ladder with written, often technical, closely

specialized promotion requirements and when a great many NCO billets demand clerical or technical skills, those are the skills you elicit.

Surely, because the Corps is still the Corps, leadership and basic soldiering receive weight and respect and a lot more than lip service. But, we cannot escape the fact that there are now some avenues for NCO promotion through which the traffic in human leadership is slack.

Perhaps we can regret that in today's Marine Corps the MOS system still has no job code labelled "Leader," which should be every NCOs primary military specialty. The increased need for specialist NCOs is an inexorable by-product of the times. There is really not a great deal, except hard training and aggressive, driving, high-octane officer leadership and example that can ameliorate the conditions we have so far examined.

But it lies well within the capabilities of our system (and of each individual officer) to jacked up to the utmost the levels and standards which we demand of NCOs—and of all Marines. As we roll up our sleeves for this job, it might be well to see some of the forces which we shall be working against.

The first of these is a familiar one: inflation.

The Marine Corps noncommissioned officer world is centered about the strongest inflationary focus of

all—the numerical requirement for more NCOs than ever before.

But contributory inflationary forces have also been at work. For example—the rank of private first class in a good starting point.

In 1937's Marine Corps, the ratio of privates first class to privates was one to three (1:3). That is to say, out of every four nonrated men, only one was a Pfc. Promotion to private first class was anything but automatic. Indeed, the Pfc, M1937, was usually being groomed as a probationary corporal (in fact, the original title of the one-chevron rank was lance-corporal). Except for few *fortunati* with more readily attained seagoing warrants, the first chevron often awaited shipping-over day on a Marine's second cruise.

Where do we stand today?

The basic ratio of privates first class to privates has exactly reversed itself.

Out of every four nonrated men, only one is a private. In 1954 there are 900 per cent as many Pfc's in relation to privates as there were in 1937. Promotion to Pfc is all but automatic, and the one-time lance corporal has now been debased to a "superior private,"—if we may borrow the title of a Japanese rating—and occasionally not a very superior one at that.

Skyrocket changes in the enlisted pay structure shouldn't be overlooked, either.



The '30s: it took grooming to be an NCO

In 1937, promotion to private first class brought a monthly pay raise of 50 per cent. Today, the same promotion entails an increase of about three per cent a month. And don't forget that a reduction from Pfc to private likewise only cuts skin-deep today by that three per cent, rather than bone-deep by the one-third reduction of years gone by.

As for the few privates we now have, even they make so much money, that the incentive to utmost performance and NCO aspiration has inevitably led down.

Today's noncommissioned officer, compared to nonrated Marines, is no longer the man of property he once was. Nor, compared in turn to the



A corporal used to do it

corporals and sergeants, is the staff noncom a veritable Rockefeller. Moreover, even privates can afford to keep automobiles—a Marine Corps sociological change whose full impact has yet to be adequately appraised.

Inflation of NCO promotion, both in rate of climb and in pay, has diminished wholly desirable former clannish distinctions between corporal and private, not to mention those between the first three pay grades and the remainder of the enlisted Corps. This means that sergeants make liberty and play cards with privates—and then wonder why the privates don't snap to as they should. Or that some officers, when giving a lift to a carload of Marines, allow staff NCOs to be squeezed, three or four in the back seat, while a Pfc takes his ease up front as copilot.

Closely related to the disappearance of caste among noncommissioned officers—and probably stemming from it—is still another symptom of inflation. Some diminution of the scope of responsibilities traditionally expected of the noncommissioned officer.

For example, on my first tour at Quantico, some 15 years ago, the battalion duty NCO (or "charge-of-quarters") in a certain barracks then occupied by a battalion was a corporal. This man was sometimes spelled on the guard roster by trustworthy or promising privates first class. In that very same barracks, 1952, still occupied by a single battalion, *each company* was required to maintain a staff NCO (including, more's the shame, first pay-grade men) to attend to what one corporal had handled for an entire battalion before World War II: e.g., turn off lights at Taps, answer the telephone, check out liberty men and give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.

Fifteen years ago it was all but unheard of that a noncommissioned officer, even a new-made corporal, walked post as a sentinel, served as a messman, or appeared on a working party except as some kind of straw boss. Today, such deplorable occurrences are not unknown, and in spite of everybody's regret and good intentions to the contrary, the NCO's status as leader and supervisor cannot help but be diminished.

Naturally, no commanding officer



Shanghai—1938: no 0800-1630 routine

wants to reduce the status of his NCOs, but today's rank-heavy and talent-heavy commands (especially headquarters, service, or specialist units) require so many NCOs and so many expensive skills that there seems to be hardly enough privates to hew wood and draw water. Many Chiefs and few Indians.

And as sergeants begin to fall out as working members of working parties, junior officers tend to oversupervise (or nobody supervises), which further still accelerates the cycle.

The loss of fine NCOs—as noncommissioned officers—through promotion by temporary commissions is the last inflationary force which I shall mention.

The Marine Corps pioneered year-in-year-out promotion of meritorious NCOs to commissioned rank long before the practice was ever thought of, as policy, among the other services and the Corps can well boast of this. It is, nevertheless, a hard fact that the relatively widespread availability of temporary commissions necessitated by conditions of the past decade, or so, has made the E-7 pay grade a direction

instead of a destination, a way station for the able, ambitious NCO, instead of his goal. An inevitable corollary of this is that some who come to rest in top pay-grades are the less qualified, rather than the best among the senior noncommissioned officers—as used to be the case. Attainment of the first pay grade has not, in recent years, been an NCO accolade comparable, career-wise, to attainment of stars for an officer.

There have been, moreover, still other adverse forces to contend with beside the inflation.

One gaping breakdown, now under repair, has been the almost general decline of first sergeants and sergeants major from leaders to file clerks, from field men to field desk men, from outdoorsmen to indoorsmen. John A. Lejeune, no less, is generally credited with the ringing passage in the old Marine Corps Manual which proclaimed that "the first sergeant must be the first sergeant in fact as well as in name." Until a few months ago, that first sergeant (and his elder cousin, the sergeant major) was swallowed up in our administrative gobbledegook as

an "administrative chief."


Another complaint which may perhaps be levelled at the MOS system (at whose door the first sergeant/sergeant major mutations can undoubtedly be laid) is the fact that it imposed premature overspecialization on quite junior enlisted men (privates first class and corporals), thus emphasizing specialist proficiency during the future NCO's formative years.

Still another break with past NCO traditions is the 0800-1630 attitude. We all have encountered examples. If it can't be done in union hours, it lies over until tomorrow, or until Monday. This attitude, I believe, stems from two causes, both of which tend to draw the noncommissioned officer away from his billet and his working place far more than in the past. The first cause is high pay (which in turn permits frequent, sometimes seemingly continual liberty as well as automobiles to go with it). The second cause, bluntly, is marriage. Fifteen years ago the married NCO below the third pay grade was a curiosity, an economic phenomenon. Today, the bachelor first sergeant who lives in barracks with his command is a rarity, and many of the more junior noncoms (who ought to be holding down corner bunks in the squad-rooms) are ashore obediently wiping dishes after supper. This means less round-the-clock supervision for the privates, less daily contact between senior NCOs and their men, less hours per day of NCO attention to duty.

Among the NCOs themselves, as throughout the Corps at large, abolition of the resounding, distinctive Marine rank-titles for NCOs, such as "gunnery sergeant," remains and will continue to be a matter of uneasiness which has contributed in no small measure to the decline of NCO status and prestige. Since this matter has already been dealt with in past issues of the GAZETTE, I shall let the observation stand without further enlargement.

Somewhat earlier, I commented on the necessity of keeping Marine Corps standards (especially for NCOs) tuned to the highest pitch. In the long term, no single Marine Corps institution can contribute more to the process of maintaining

Empty NCO rooms—no round-the-clock supervision



those levels and standards than the recruit depots.

The recruit depot's unvarying past success constitutes as much of a glory for the Marine Corps as any of our victories in battle. The effects of Marine recruit training on our NCO situation are incalculably great, almost total.

Now the recruit depot has two vital functions as regards noncommissioned officers. Its first and most general function, obviously, stems from the fact that every recruit (and hence every future NCO) graduates from recruit depot. And the recruit depot is the seed-bed of the Marine Corps attitude. Important as are the basic military techniques which the recruit depot teaches, infinitely more important is the Marine Corps attitude which it instills. A Marine can learn techniques (and forget them too) all along his career; he acquires his military attitude only once, and that is usually at the outset of his career, in recruit depot.

Like a sensitized plate, the Marine recruit will take only one clear exposure, and that first exposure will be printed on him throughout his service. Recruit depot, so to speak, is the camera which affords and regulates that initial exposure.

What this means, as far as NCOs are concerned, is that the NCO attitude throughout the Corps can be made and unmade by the recruit depots. Considering that this is so, it is disturbing whenever one hears ill-informed, outside criticism of Marine recruit depots as "too rigorous," and to encounter hints of relaxation of those rigors. Any comparison between the combat performance of Parris Island and San Diego graduates in three major wars of this century, beside those not fortunate enough to have gone through Marine recruit training, ought to drive home the essential lessons.

Any letdown at the recruit depots means ultimate letdown among the noncommissioned officers. It is time to stop, look and listen, when a reflective, observant Pfc actually could say, "When I enlisted, I expected recruit training to be tough — really tough. It wasn't tough at all. It was too easy. I was disappointed."

The second way in which recruit depots directly affect our NCO situation is as training grounds for bet-

ter noncommissioned leadership via the drill-instructor system. There are few better NCO leaders in the world than a good Marine Corps DI. Today, approximately 500 enlisted men are performing duty as DIs. Every one of these men is, or should be, learning as he teaches — learning how to lead and train Marines. Because of this unmatched opportunity to train leaders on the job, we should select our DIs with utmost care, and we should consciously attempt to let drill-instructor duty serve as a school for noncommissioned leaders.

Are we exploiting this opportunity to the extent that we might? Remember that the recruit is only as good as his DI, and that the recruit in turn is tomorrow's NCO and tomorrow's DI.

II

THE MARINE CORPS NCO situation, particularly in its leadership aspects, has changed appreciably over a rather short time. The causes


the inevitables, too, I think a number of avoidables have worsened our NCO situation.

Some of these avoidables I have touched on earlier in this article. In aggregate they have diluted our NCO leadership potential.

So now let us look at the bright side of the ledger. Let us see what signs of improvement or stabilization lighten the horizon. And let us then consider how the situation might still further be improved.

The most promising aspect of today's NCO situation is the wide distribution of combat experience and leadership experience which the Korean War has brought to all Marines, noncommissioned officers conspicuously included.

To appreciate what this means, we have only to be aware of the fact that more than 60 per cent of all commissioned Marine officers, and about 50 per cent of all enlisted Marines served in combat in Korea — a triumph of personnel policy when you consider that the Corps



MCRD: training ground for NCOs as well as recruits

of this change, it seems to me, are mainly beyond the control of individual noncommissioned officers, and some of them are beyond the control of Marine Corps Headquarters itself. Certainly it is nobody's fault that modern war is so complicated that we need more technicians to operate its machines, or that we need slightly more administrative overhead to run a greatly enlarged Corps.

But I do assert that these blind forces have brought about some deterioration within the NCO corps (as they have throughout all the armed services). Hand in hand with

was maintaining two combat-ready divisions and two air wings elsewhere than in Korea.

This wise and traditional program, which got the maximum number of Marines into battle, will pay dividends for a long time. Thus, our noncommissioned officer corps can — if we continue to recruit and re-enlist with discretion — remain a hard core of combat-experienced professionals who know, every man jack, what the whistle of a bullet sounds like.

An equally encouraging by-product of this same policy — that is, of getting all hands into combat at



Combat experience: basic ingredient of soldiering and leadership

some stage of the game—is that despite our enlarged supporting establishment and larger security force commitments (which go hand in hand with the restoration, post-1949, of U. S. Naval power), we seem in scant peril of building up a Chair Corps of coffee-cooling stateside Marines. It is a wry satisfaction, even at the height of battle with some contumacious administrator, to note that he wears current campaign ribbons and battle stars—and it probably gives him a lift over his own dreary rituals.

And on this subject of the supporting establishment and the security forces, it is another noteworthy point that, despite strength cuts in the new budget, more Marines than ever will go into the operating forces this year. That means that more NCOs than ever are being occupied in the primary business of all Marines—which is combat, or training for combat.


Now for another heartening achievement: the fine results achieved by the recruiters in getting the Corps back to a volunteer outfit. And no aspect of this success is more important than the percentages of NCOs who are shipping over.

With combat experience as the raw material, and with the experienced men re-enlisting, it is not surprising that we are searching for means to polish this raw material into finished products. That accounts, I believe, for the recurrent

interest in formal NCO schools—a type of institution long established in most other highly professional corps or armies of the world. As early as 1951, in fact, the 1st Marine Division, in the field, organized such a school. The fruits of that institution, which taught NCOs how to lead, how to instruct and how to behave like noncommissioned officers, were reflected throughout the division across its wide fighting front. I understand, as well, that a Marine Corps school of this type is or was under consideration for Quantico. I sincerely hope so.

Earlier, I pointed a finger at the ritualization of NCO promotion procedures—written examinations, true-false/multiple-choice “knowl-

A veritable sunburst of reform, moreover, has been the recently announced policy of Marine Corps Headquarters “to restore the authority and prestige of the office of First Sergeant and Sergeant Major”—to quote the Commandant’s trenchant language. This démarche has re-created the “Top” and the sergeant major as definite entities in our personnel system, with MOS all their own and leadership qualities at the top of the tree. Annual selection boards will screen the E-7 and E-6 pay-grades for the NCOs most deserving of the high status of first sergeant and sergeant major and no more will the jobs be monopolies among the administrative brahmins. Hallelujah!



edge” of narrowly defined fields. Instead of the traditional marshal’s baton, every NCO must now carry the IBM machine’s electric pencil in his knapsack.

This philosophy of promotion, say what you will, brings some advantage to the clerky, studious fellow at the expense of the rough-hewn gunnery-sergeant type. Probably we do need a few more clerky Marines, but I think most COs have been heartened by the way in which Headquarters Marine Corps has simplified the enlisted MOS structure and has extended more local discretion to commands in selecting and promoting their own NCOs. These changes have shifted the spotlight where it belongs: primarily on the man’s qualifications as a leader of Marines. The drift of events has been in the right direction.

Still another healthy sign is the effort being made to hold the line against premature marriage by junior NCOs, both in restricting their eligibility for allowances and their eligibility for re-enlistment.

Similarly, the 1954 restrictions on re-enlistment of some men whose records, performance, or inherent qualifications have not measured up, will drain off sludge and thus improve the general quality of the base from which the noncommissioned officer is drawn.

So good reasons exist, even today, for encouragement about our noncommissioned officers and about the traditional Marine small-unit leadership of which they constitute both nub and nexus. This encouragement seems the more justified because of the patent concern and direct interest which all commands evince daily.

in the NCO situation and its challenges.

III

As I HAVE TRACED the symptoms and etiology of today's NCO situation, I have tried to point out that many, if not the majority of the causative factors are systematic or situational in character.

That is to say, that these problems come mainly as unwanted by-products of inevitable changes in the nature of war and in the Marine Corps situation. Change is inevitable, progress is not. Thus, if we are to meet these challenges we cannot content ourselves with short-term remedies, nor can we afford to look for remedies only within existing framework.

Four major avenues of attack are open. Stated generally, rather than

tudes and search for things that the Marine Corps might be able to accomplish.

Although training has always been a Marine Corps long suit, I do not believe we have scratched the surface in formal noncommissioned officer education.

I propose that attainment of permanent NCO rank, and any type of promotion, permanent or temporary, to staff NCO rank, be dependent on mandatory completion of formal NCO schooling, or of a successful tour as a recruit depot drill instructor.

The NCO schooling I propose should emphasize leadership, general military subjects and Marine Corps attitude. Again a broadly balanced approach.

Here is a possible system. Estab-

lish Marine Corps Noncommissioned Officer Schools at Quantico and San Diego. Place these schools under the technical control, of course, of the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools. Require that satisfactory completion of the resident Noncommissioned Officer Course at either school be a prerequisite to permanent appointment as an NCO, and a prerequisite to any type of promotion above the fourth pay grade.

In other words, all NCO warrants issued throughout the Marine Corps to non-graduates of the school would remain temporary until the individual in question had graduated from NCO School. If, after holding such a temporary appointment, the noncommissioned officer in question failed his course at NCO School, his appointment would automatically terminate and he would revert to private first class.

One exception might be permitted. For the benefit of Marines at outlying posts or at sea, the Extension School, MCS, could conduct a correspondence version of the Noncommissioned Officer Course. Successful completion of this could be accepted in lieu of graduation from a resident NCO Course (and thus for permanent appointment) up to the grade of sergeant, but not beyond. Graduation from a resident course, with the full treatment, would be mandatory for promotion to staff sergeant or higher.

For the man who wants to earn his chevrons on the job—the Marine who fights shy of schools—the recruit depot drill-instructor system could be harnessed as an alternative to NCO School. Bear in mind that, much as the DI teaches, he learns more. And he learns the very skills that today's NCO corps needs most: general military subjects, and above all, leadership and command presence.

By virtue of graduation from Drill Instructor's School, followed up by systematic weeding, the man who completes his tour as drill instructor should be considered qualified for permanent NCO status.

In short, a full tour as a recruit depot DI, preceded by screening and DI School, should be counted as



Schooling: should be a prerequisite for promotion

in terms of specific measures, these approaches sound almost platitudinous.

(1) Radically improve the quality, breadth—and above all, the balance of noncommissioned officer training and all training which is ultimately contributory to the NCO corps.

(2) Enhance the status and prestige of the noncommissioned officer.

(3) Capitalize to greater extent on available or potential experience.

(4) Promote and employ noncommissioned officers primarily for leadership duties.

As you read them, those four points do sound platitudinous. Just as platitudinous—and as true—as telling a man he won't have trouble making Expert on the rifle range if he holds 'em and squeezes.

But let's go behind those plati-

litudes and search for things that the Marine Corps might be able to accomplish.

Although training has always been a Marine Corps long suit, I do not believe we have scratched the surface in formal noncommissioned officer education.



equivalent — in the NCO education scheme I advance — to successful graduation from the resident Non-commissioned Officer Course.

Don't overlook an important secondary benefit which would accrue from using DI status as a route to promotion, namely, that this means of earning permanent NCO status would encourage ambitious men to seek assignment as drill instructors, and thus draw DIs from the cream of the crop.

Notice, before we leave the subject of NCO training, that the focus of the training and promoting schemes I suggest, rests squarely on leadership, general military subjects, command presence and Marine Corps attitude. I would not wish to

however, which would also build up the prestige of the NCO.

At the top of the list stands proper recognition by officers — particularly the junior officers — of the role and status of the noncommissioned officer. Every officer must realize that NCOs are also leaders — foremen, if you want to think of them in such terms. Every officer must bend over backward to protect the leader-status of his own noncoms, and of every Marine noncom.

The story is told — an extreme case perhaps — of a sea-lawyer private who complained to his detachment commander, "Captain, can Corporal So-and-So do this to me?"

To which the captain replied, "Go ask the corporal."

Every officer can find at least one chance per working day to take some action, however small, which will demonstrate to the troops (and to the NCOs as well) that noncommissioned officers are leaders, to be respected as such.

I say that the first pay-grade, especially the traditional eminence of sergeant-major, should once again become a goal in itself, the crown of a long and successful career rather than a springboard. The effect of this reversion to older ways would be to elevate greatly the standing and prestige of all staff NCOs, and would help re-establish the somewhat tarnished hierarchy of the first three pay grades.

"When you can't raise their pay, widen the stripe on their trousers," runs an old soldiers' proverb. The obvious good sense of this saying was negated after World War II by conscious attempts (not in the Marine Corps, fortunately) to abolish or minimize the outward distinguishing badges of rank and differences in uniform between officers and enlisted men and between NCOs and privates.

The Marine Corps might well spearhead the reaction to this absurd trend (which was seemingly premised on the idea that officers and NCOs had something to be ashamed of) by looking into simple uniform changes which would emphasize NCO status and distinguish the NCO from the nonrated man. We already have one in the scarlet trouser-stripe on blues. There are others which the Permanent Uniform Board might look into:

(1) Enlarge the size of chevrons to full arm-width, so as to increase visibility, similar to the chevrons which the British forces have always employed to keep noncommissioned officers from being mistaken for anything but noncommissioned officers.

(2) Add brass beading to the bills of barracks caps worn by first pay-grade NCOs (or perhaps only by sergeants major). This would be the enlisted equivalent of a field or general officer's "scrambled eggs," and would serve to distinguish the top noncommissioned officer. It would complement, and be in line with, the dress belt-buckle now prescribed for the first pay-graders.

Marines respect traditions. I find it unarguable that restoration of the rank-titles of gunnery sergeant and sergeant major on some basis compatible with current machine records and personnel accounting would do much to win our new NCOs the respect and prestige which these fine titles still connote. This is an administrative change which would cost little more than pen changes in our manuals and T/Os. It could be effected tomorrow by a stroke of the pen. We have already gone half the way toward this resurrection by revival of the sergeant major MOS. Why not finish the job?

Much earlier in this essay, we took a dour look at today's private first class.

The Pfc doesn't do the Marine Corps, or its NCO structure, very much good. There are far too many (in numerical ratio to the privates), he gets his virtually meaningless chevron with hardly a grunt, he costs more to pay, and his advancement contributes little if anything to the Marine Corps base of NCO potential. In addition, he narrows the gap between corporal and private, a gap which should be wider than it now is.

The status and prestige of the junior NCOs could be much improved by virtual abolition of the rating of Pfc. Retain the rank, yes, but retain it very definitely as a lance-corporal status, and effect quantum reduction in today's high ratio of Pfc to private. If some pay increase seems desirable to recognize emergence of the recruit from his chrysalis after six months' service,

No longer a pinnacle of prestige


abolish any existing, exclusively technical requirements for advancement in any of the respective occupational fields.


Enhancement of the status and prestige of the noncommissioned officer corps may be regarded as one of the main keys to Marine Corps small-unit leadership.

By "status and prestige," I do not mean better NCO clubs, shorter hours and longer stateside tours. I do mean the unquestioning deference and respect which experts and leaders, recognizable as such, receive automatically.

Thus, enhancement of NCO status and prestige must spring, at bedrock, from better noncommissioned officers with ever improving professional qualifications.

There are subsidiary measures,





then let us seek such a premium (comparable to the present pay differential between private and Pfc) in future pay legislation. Let us seek a substantial pay increase for the private first class, new style.

Two expedients exist, I believe, by which the Marine Corps could capitalize even more fully than now on potential professional experience at the noncommissioned officer level.

The first expedient is the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. We all know that the Fleet Reserve is made up of 20-year men who receive retainer pay because their experience is a sheet anchor for mobilization and expansion — because these veterans are, we think, as permanently trained as a Marine can ever be.

When you think it over, 20-year men are the very people we need today. These are the men who can thicken our base of experience; these are the veterans who can train new NCOs and inspire candidates.

There are plenty of the right jobs — for the right men, of course — jobs in which the FMCR could do a lot for today's Corps, and jobs which senior Fleet Reservists might find attractive. For example, what better berth for a 20-year gunnery sergeant than in a Naval ROTC unit (there are 52, I think), or with the I&I of an Organized Reserve battalion or squadron? Probably the big rifle ranges could find agreeable spots for such talent. And Basic School and the recruit depots — where *couldn't* you use them?

Thus, I propose that we set on foot a two-pronged program both for luring back the best Fleet Re-

servists (carefully screened for quality) onto active-duty jobs they like; and for inducing the same quality of man, approaching 20-year retirement, to ship over for 30, with the same sort of bait. Let such individuals keep their jobs as long as qualified, give them job security, leave them free to revert to inactive status, and let us profit at the key spots from their experience and maturity.

The second reservoir of NCO potential lies beyond the seas.

Today, the world is far more heavily surcharged with DPs, practically all of whom possess military experience. And today, the Army is enlisting qualified DPs abroad: men who are eager to serve under our Colors and who thereby, under the law, become eligible for certain shortcuts in obtaining U. S. citizenship. What a chance for the Marine Corps!

In the U.K. alone, not a week passes but our London Marine Detachment is approached by highly desirable, venturesome Englishmen, Scots and Irishmen, who have completed their National Service for the Crown, and would like a taste of the Marine Corps.

If the administrative hurdles can be surmounted, and if our past experience provides any signposts, such foreign recruits would add much to the NCO potential of the Corps.

Time and again during this long article, I have pointed out that the salient factor, the catalytic agent in changing our NCO corps from its earlier entity to that of 1954 has

been 1954's demand for technicians and administrators rather than leaders.

Many noncommissioned officers who have risen to meet this demand have proven themselves leaders as well as technicians. Anyone who has seen the Marine air wing or the combat service group in the field (both formations heavily stocked with technicians) will abundantly testify that this is so.

But to what extent has such triumph of leadership over technique been fortunate human accident, or demonstration of persistent Marine Corps atavism?

And is not the *raison d'être* of the noncommissioned officer of Marines to lead other Marines, rather than to operate a gadget?

If you admit the foregoing premise, another can be drawn, viz., that those who now put on chevrons solely or primarily because of technical or administrative skills ought not, in blunt truth, to be noncommissioned officers. Status they deserve, extra pay they deserve, and extra privileges, too, all according to their levels of skill.

But do they deserve — solely as technical men — the status of the NCO?

Obviously not. At one time, indeed until 1941, the Marine Corps had two answers to this paradox.

Answer 1: NCOs whose jobs were primarily technical or administrative but nonetheless demanded leadership and management ability (drum major, quartermaster sergeant, paymaster sergeant, etc.), wore chevrons but with a horizontal





Mandatory resident schooling

base instead of the arc which distinguished "line" ratings (such as platoon sergeant, gunnery sergeant, first sergeant, sergeant major, etc.).

Answer 2: For Marines whose personality-profiles included high skills but little or no leadership, there was the system of "specialist" ratings." This device provided six classes of specialists who received extra pay which, when added to the pay of a private, would correspond to the remaining six pay grades through which a private might otherwise be promoted. That is, a specialist at the top of his field could draw down about the same pay as a sergeant major, *but not the chevrons or the military authority.* The chevrons of those days thus denoted leadership: Lejeune's first sergeant who was first in fact as well as in name.

At the very hour, however, when the Corps suffered its first major influx of technicians (like the radar NCOs with whom we started out), the specialist-rating system went into the GI can, possibly because it seemed that this approach afforded insufficient prestige, at the time, to attract skilled technical men.

In 1954 I believe it is high time to re-examine such a system, or at least an up-to-date modification thereof.

It is my suggestion that the occupational fields for staff NCOs be segregated into two categories—command fields (such as 03, 08, etc., but not limited to them), and technical/administrative fields (such as 01 and 04). Noncommissioned officers holding rank in a command field would rate the "line" arcs under their chevrons, while those in a technical/administrative field would wear the horizontal "staff" base. It is noticeable today, some years after abolition of the horizontal bar, how

many quartermaster and pay NCOs still display with pride the old chevrons of this type. Based on this indubitable fact, I cannot consider that reinstatement of the distinction would be invidious.

The salient advantage of return to the specialist rating is that the corps of noncommissioned officers would at once become again solely and singly a corps of leaders. The corresponding disadvantages (other than some administrative complication) would be some sense of lost prestige or umbrage among technicians or specialists no longer NCOs. This objection could be met by a gradual substitution of specialist ratings for current technical NCO billets (no involuntary conversion of anyone now wearing chevrons to the specialist-rating status), and by proper extension of privileges and perquisites commensurate with skills. Moreover, any specialist who also possessed the military personality and force to win his rating like any other NCO would always be free to do so.

In this way, then, we could invigorate our whole enlisted leadership.

• IN SUMMARY AND IN CONCLUSION, I am convinced that today's individual standards and caliber of Marine noncommissioned officer leadership, performance and status can be improved.

Such improvement, I am also convinced, could be attained by:

1. Mandatory resident schooling for noncommissioned officers.
2. Exploitation of the drill-instructor system as a normal avenue of NCO promotion.
3. More protection for the leader-status of the noncommissioned officer, through segregation from non-

rated men, freedom from oversupervision and employment as Chiefs rather than Indians.

4. Marked constriction over the long term in temporary promotion of enlisted men to commissioned rank.

5. Reduction in the total percentage of privates first class and promotion to private first class only in recognition of potential NCO material—in other words, conversion of the Pfc to a lance-corporal.

6. Further modification of the uniform to emphasize NCO status.

7. Restoration of certain of the traditional rank-titles for Marine Corps staff NCOs.

8. Special inducements to keep 20-year men on active duty for key jobs.

9. Division of staff NCO occupational fields into "command" and "technical-administrative" categories, with concomitant restoration of the horizontal base for chevrons of staff NCOs in the latter category.

10. Adoption of an M-1955 version of the pre-World War II system of specialist ratings.

11. Selection and promotion of noncommissioned officers primarily for qualities of military leadership.

By implementing all, or any part of this 11-point program, we can seize opportunity by the forelock and measure up to 1954's great challenge from within. And as we thus sustain and emphasize the leadership of our noncommissioned officers, so we foster and sustain the Corps.

USMC

Long lost . . . or just resting?



... a man to lead them

Russia 1941 . . .

In the Ivanovskaya area, there occurred only scattered local actions. An attempt by the enemy, coming from the north with a weak force along the artificial lake, to reach the sluice bridge, was easily repulsed. On the other hand, a surprise attack coming from the west, out of the woods, conducted by an infantry unit accompanied by a heavy tank, was not so pleasant. Its objective was the crippling of the command, which was presumed, by the enemy, to be located in the church area. It was true that the German forces were quickly able to hurl back the infantry which had broken through the security forces, but the heavy tank came out of the woods so rapidly and so close to the well-camouflaged 10-cm (100mm) cannon, that the latter never got a shot at it. It circled around the church and ran over everything that caught its eye — including the regimental headquarters. Our own tanks had to look on helplessly, since their fire was ineffective against this monster. Only an especially daring non-commissioned officer was able to bring about its end. He rushed at the tank and, leaping onto it, fired time after time with his pistol into the vision slot of the driver. Injured by lead fragments and hindered in his observation, the driver was forced to turn around in order to oblige his troublesome guest passenger. The tank was compelled to abandon its well-chosen position and again passed close to the 10-cm cannon. Just before it passed through the German lines, the non-commissioned officer leaped down and left the giant to its fate. The smallest weapon had put the heaviest tank to flight. The tank had scarcely entered "no-man's-land" when a direct hit from the 10-cm cannon caused it to burst into flames.

(An excerpt from The Gateway to Leningrad published in the Septem-

ber, 1954 issue of the Military Review.)

Pearl Harbor 1941 . . .

Corporal "D" was another Marine gunner. A large caliber bomb fell a few yards away from his gun that was pouring AA shells at the enemy planes. The blast blew the corporal off his feet and against the mounting of another gun. He picked himself up and ran through the smoke to his own gun. When he arrived, the men of his crew who were still alive looked at him with horror. His clothes had all but been burned off, and he had a terrible gaping wound showing through the leg of his smouldering pants. His hair was also burned and his face scorched. The corpsmen came with stretchers to take away the wounded. The corporal brushed them aside with a gesture. "I'm all right; take the other guys . . . let me be."

He was sighting another gun when a second bomb put it out of action. When he emerged from the blast still active and capable, the corporal's mates must have thought that he was immortal.

He went to another gun and took the place of a gunner who lay dead. When the next wave of planes came, the battery was still firm. All around the battery, buildings were in flames and the smoke was drifting in clouds across the gun positions. The corpsmen came again to collect the casualties, but the corporal did not count himself as such, even when the attack had died down. He found a job giving first aid to the wounded and helping them to the ambulances.

(Excerpt from Semper Fidelis by Keith Ayling.)

Korea 1953 . . .

The company had successfully scaled the precipitous face of the enemy's strong position and, after

routing him from his bunkers and trenches, had destroyed the fortifications and withdrew according to plan.

At the gate through the barbed wire, a nose-count was held — six men were missing.

The "Gunny," who was the senior NCO in command, immediately called for a squad of volunteers and led them back to the assault area.

The preparatory smoke that had been laid on the hill for the attack and withdrawal had blown away and our Arty cover had ceased at the time the sergeant led his men across "No-man's-land." Again they scaled the position, re-entering the forbidding trenches in the face of the enemy. The action was laid bare and stark to the observers of both sides in the crisp February air.

By the time the volunteer squad closed on the position, the enemy had recovered and came pouring down from their main positions and were tossing grenades and delivering small-arms fire down on the rescue squad. At the same time, machine-gun and mortar fire was directed against the small force from supporting enemy positions which, now that the smoke laid down to cover the original withdrawal had cleared, had unobscured observation on the entire area.

Ignoring the heavy fire, the "Gunny" coolly directed the rescue of four wounded Marines who were laying on the forward slope and then carried out a further search of the enemy's positions and surrounding terrain until the other two bodies were located.

Then as enemy reinforcements advanced, he withdrew his men and all the casualties through the hail of mortar and machine-gun fire to friendly lines.

(Adapted from citation for Navy Cross for heroism in raid on outpost Detroit in Korea on 25 February, 1953.)

USMC

the CHEVRON

The chevron symbolizes rank, but more important it represents faithful service, experience and the ever growing burden of responsibility that accompanies it



By Major John H. Magruder, III

AS LONG AS THERE HAVE BEEN MEN GIVING ORDERS AND OTHERS TAKING them, all military organizations have found it necessary to adopt some means of distinguishing rank. While the chevrons on the sleeve of the enlisted Marine represent the rungs in the ladder of promotion, they symbolize far more than mere rank — faithful service, experience and the ever-growing burden of responsibility that accompanies it. The chevron is probably one of the most important badges in the Marine Corps today. Its significance is enormous; its past is an important element in our long line of tradition.

The first mention of the chevron, as an indication of NCO rank, was made in a formal uniform order issued in 1822 which stated that "the rank between Noncommissioned Officers [was to be] designated as



DRUM MAJOR'S.



QUARTERMASTER SERGEANT'S.



III SERGEANT'S.



SERGEANT'S.




SERGEANT MAJOR'S.




CORPORAL'S.

SERVICE CHEVRON.

US Marine Uniform regulation chevrons in 1875



NCO Club, 1888—Chevrons were as flamboyant as the NCOs



In the 1860s, overcoats had chevrons on the cuff

follows. The Sergt. Major, Quartermaster Sergt., Drum and Fife Majors to wear two angles [of yellow worsted] on the right arm above the elbows, similar to those worn on the cuffs, points running in the same direction. Sergts. one angle on the right arm, Corporals one on the left, points running as above."

Prior to 1822, noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps had been distinguished by shoulder decorations and the wearing of a red feather on the left side of their hats. In 1798, corporals wore a small yel-

1825 — First lieutenants wore chevrons on each arm



low worsted epaulette on the left shoulder while sergeants carried epaulettes on both sides. From 1804 until 1822, sergeants were identified by yellow shoulder knots which replaced the earlier epaulette.

It is interesting to note that in the early days of the Corps, the chevron was not restricted to use by the noncoms. Regulations published in 1821 authorized that this badge be adopted by subalterns: "the rank between First and Second Lieutenants, to be designated as follows, First Lieutenants, to wear on each arm, above the elbow, one angle (chevron), points running in the same direction as the angles on the cuffs, and of the same kind of lace [i.e. gold]; Second Lieutenants, to wear one angle on the right arm as described above. A First Lieutenant in the Staff, to wear two angles on the right arm, and one on the left arm."

ORDERS PUBLISHED in 1833 dropped the chevron as a badge of rank but continued its use as an emblem of service, "Noncommissioned officers, Musicians and privates, who have served faithfully for the term of four years shall be permitted, as a mark of distinction, to wear a chevron on the sleeves of their coats above the elbow, points up; and an additional chevron on each arm for every four years faithfully served."

Rank on the dress uniform was denoted by the number of buttons displayed on the cuff of the sleeve—four for the top pay grade, three for buck sergeants and two for corporals and privates. In addition, all non-commissioned officers wore worsted fringes on their wings (modified epaulettes) while privates had plain wings without the fringe.

It was at this time that the "hash mark" made its debut, but for a different purpose than it is employed today. This badge was authorized in 1833 as an insignia of rank on the fatigue uniform. Orders stated that "sergeants . . . will be designated by wearing two small stripes of worsted lace on each arm from one seam to the other, the outer points inclining towards the elbow. Corporals will wear one stripe on each arm, in the manner designated for Sergeants."

The means of distinguishing enlisted rank adopted in 1833 was continued until 1859 when trends in

clothing styles forced the military to forsake the tight coatee with its tails hanging down behind for the more comfortable and practical frock coat identified with the Civil War period.

The Uniform Regulations of 1859 read almost as familiarly as current ones.

"Chevrons: Shall be worn on the uniform coat above the elbow, points up, of yellow silk lace one-half inch wide, as follows:

For a Sergeant Major.—Three bars and an arc on a scarlet ground.

For a Quarter Master Sergeant.—Three bars and a tie on a scarlet ground.

From a Drum Major.—Three bars and a tie, with a star in the center, on a scarlet ground.


For Sergeants.—Chevrons of yellow worsted half-inch lace, placed above the elbow, points up, as follows: For First Sergeants, three bars and a lozenge, edged with scarlet; other Sergeants, three bars edged with scarlet.

For a Corporal.—Same as for Sergeants, except that the chevrons shall consist of two bars each."

From 1859 on, the chevron's use has remained unchanged. Only the size has varied. Until 1917, the chevron stretched from front seam to back seam covering a generous portion of the sleeve. During the First World War it was reduced to its present size which approximates that originally adopted in 1822.

An interesting sidelight on the chevron is the fact that the US Army originally wore this NCO badge reversed: that is, with the point facing down. In 1903, the War Department changed to the Marine style, with point up. Thus, the Marine Corps can claim the longest uninterrupted manner by which non-commissioned officers have been designated.

This continuity of tradition makes the NCO's emblem of rank a vital link with the past. Its significance dates back 133 years. Whether it designated rank or years of service, it has always implied faithful performance in the Corps on the part of the wearer. Today's chevron carries the heavy responsibility for maintaining the traditions of yesteryear and the trust of seeing that these are carried, unbroken, into the future. USMC



FAREWELL TO CANNONEERS

... the Corps lost another bit of tradition when
"Cannoneers" became "Field Artillery Batterymen"

"UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS—Loyalty to tradition and pride of accomplishment are inculcated into the men of the Corps until they are rounded into perhaps the deadliest fighting men in the world. . ." (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol 14, 1949 edition).

It is comforting to know that the learned editors of that compendium of all knowledge, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, are in accord with the least scholarly Marine's modest opinion of his own fighting prowess. (The only room for argument is their unwarranted use of the word "perhaps"). That *Britannica's* editors are astute and practical, as well

as erudite, is proven by their unerring selection of the factors that have brought us pre-eminence among all the world's military units—tradition, and its handmaiden, accomplishment. As a student of Marine Corps traditions has written "... tradition, collectively speaking, constitutes the lifeblood and stock-in-trade of the Marine Corps—."

In this age of high speed-electronic-atomic warfare, military traditions rooted in the past are often sacrificed to the magic word "prog-

ress." They are cast aside when they inconvenience some supposed administrative improvement. They are fair game to those who seek uniformity among all armed services, or among the branches or elements within a service.

If we are to defend our priceless Marine Corps traditions we must understand their nature—and how we lose them. Our traditions are not singular, they are infinitely plural. They are not monolithic, like a concrete dam—they are the many brightly colored threads from which a tough cloth is woven.

The worst enemy of military traditions such as ours is not the dramatic

By Col. F. P. Henderson

single stroke that would level us at once to mediocrity. Rather it is the insidious action of termites in the wood and moths in the cloth.

An outright attack upon one of our more cherished traditions would bring a host of defenders to the ramparts to protect it. Where we must be alert is in our guard against the administrative action, often made in good faith to obtain a minor goal of paper-work efficiency, which slays a living tradition. Viewed singly, such latter actions seem relatively unimportant. After all, what is the loss of one small tradition in a modern world of endless change and great, seemingly insolvable problems? Therein lies the danger to the

disciplined tradition of undefeated ground, sea and air combat in all the far corners of the globe.

Cannoneer is a word that belongs in a Marine's vocabulary. It is a rich, robust word. It is a precise word that describes in itself exactly what it means. Through long usage it is widely known by all, military or civilian. It can be found in any dictionary.

It tells of the ragged, frozen cannoneers who opened the Battle of Trenton, Washington's Christmas gift to the dispirited Colonies. It recalls Napoleon, with his shoulder to the wheel, helping his laboring cannoneers get their guns through the dark and the mud to the battle-

when the need arose, he has readily taken his place on the front line as a rifleman.

And in losing all of this, what have we gained? Nothing. "Field artillery batteryman" is a weak, thin-sounding, contrived term. It has no link with military history, no rich connotations of desperate battles won. It has no accepted definition through military usage and cannot be found in any dictionary published.


It is an imprecise term for it does not identify its bearer as a Marine who serves a cannon. In actuality, all men in a field artillery battery are field artillery batterymen—the cooks, truck drivers, communicators and all the rest. Even those in an H&S Battery, which doesn't have a cannon, can be called field artillery batterymen. It is administratively inefficient, for it now takes three words to say in a poorer way, what one word formerly said. (I have no idea which term is more efficient to an IBM.)

Did dropping the traditional *cannoneer* from our salty vocabulary shake the Marine Corps to its foundations? Well, hardly. But maybe there was an imperceptible tremor as the termites bored relentlessly on into our traditions. What if we continue along this road we have willfully chosen?

What is the result when the invincible Marine rifleman becomes an "infantry companyman?" What happens when a glory-laden machine gunner (like Sgt John Basilone) becomes an "infantry automatic weapons attendant?" Will our air-ground team be strengthened when our Marine pilots become "aerial vehicle operators?"

In T/O L-113, (105mm Howitzer Battery) we find that the guns are served by those insipid field artillery batteryman. But in T/O L-113, (155mm Howitzer Battery) they are served by brave *cannoneers*. (A last stand of tradition that rivals Thermopylae or the Alamo!)

A change in one of these T/Os is manifestly necessary. If we cherish our heritage of traditions, we will once again have virile, battle-hardened *cannoneers* supporting heroic Marine riflemen, and not those untried, Johnny-come-lately field artillery batterymen. USMC



whole body of our traditions.

As a recent example of this administrative assassination of tradition let us take the case of the field artillery cannoneer. Marine Corps Memorandum 48-53 (Revised enlisted classification structure) decreed that our Corps would never more have cannoneers. In their place we are to substitute something called "field artillery batterymen." The new "L" series of T/Os proceeded to carry out the sentence of execution.

The traditions of any military organization are largely reflected in its vocabulary. Its language sets it apart from civilians and from other military organizations as much as its uniforms. It tells where its members have been, what they have done and how proud they are. In this respect, we Marines have a particularly rich and colorful lingo. It portrays a


field. It brings to mind the cannoneers who stood like a stonewall with Jackson or galloped light-heartedly with Stuart. It includes the cannoneers of the 3d Bn, 10th Marines on Saipan who died defending their guns against an overwhelming Japanese attack. It describes the men of the 11th Marines at the Chosin Reservoir, firing from the road at point blank range against charging hordes of Chinese troops. It rings out in the order, "Cannoneers, Post!" which has long brought cannoneers to their guns on the double.

A Marine could be proud to be a cannoneer for it has long been an honorable title on the battlefield. To the traditions of all good cannoneers he has added his own traditions that link him inseparably to the victories of Marine infantry. Not the least of these traditions is that

43 Years in the Marine Corps

By Capt J. S. McAlister

THE REMOVAL OF THE CARBINE from FMF tables of organization, and designation of the pistol as the individual arm for all officers and master sergeants has placed this weapon in the hands of many who were previously concerned with little more than a knowledge of its functioning. Since the often admired, frequently condemned .45 is now a more common item of equipment than it has been for some years, a little background information beyond its mechanical details might be in order. In that the average Marine is receptive to arms lore in general, and specifically interested in those weapons he uses, the following comments on the development of the M1911 are offered. The search for historical evolution and variations in this pistol has consumed many idle hours, and has provided the old brute with a personality not generally considered with the candid perusal of FM 23-35.





It has nestled on the private's hip . . .

Often imitated, and long held in military circles as the criterion for semi-automatic sidearms, the M1911 and its more modern version, the M1911A1 are a tribute to the genius of John Moses Browning. This veteran sidearm is but one of several weapons developed by him, and like many of his other designs, has not yet been improved upon sufficiently to justify replacement.

Shortly after the turn of the century, semi-automatic pistols, which had been commercially successful, attracted the notice of the military. Numerous designs were submitted to the government by American and foreign inventors. After a series of tests, by 1907 all were ruled out but three, the Savage, submitted by the Savage Arms Corporation of Utica, N. Y.; the Luger, submitted by the DWM plant in Germany; and the Colt (Browning), submitted by Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company of Hartford, Conn. All of these pistols were .45 caliber. It was determined that sample orders of these pistols would be placed and the three types field-tested. Only the Savage and Colt pistols were actually delivered, with the Colt finally being selected. During this period a number of modifications were recommended by various ordnance boards and such details as the hammer spur, grip safety, slide stop and the angle of the grip underwent changes. The final version was the familiar M1911, which was proudly announced by Colt as having fired 6,000 rounds during tests without jam, misfire or breaking a part. This pistol was accepted for issue to

troops and contracts placed with Colt for early delivery.

Prior to the first World War, the M1911 pistol was produced only by the Colt Patent Firearms Mfg. Co. and Springfield Armory. In April, 1917 the total of such pistols on hand numbered approximately 75,000. Contracts were immediately let for production of the M1911, but during the course of the war only one additional manufacturer actually delivered. The Remington Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Conn. produced approximately 13,000 pistols before manufacture was suspended at the close of the war.

Wartime shortages of sidearms were met, and essentially overcome, by adapting two large frame revolvers (already in production) to the use of the .45 auto cartridge. The development of the half moon clip by Smith & Wesson made possible the

employment of a rimless cartridge in the cylinder of a revolver and provided the fastest known method of loading and extraction with these weapons. The simple alterations in cylinder length to allow sufficient space for the clips permitted production of an adequate military side-arm with existing machinery. The combined production of Colt and Smith & Wesson during World War I was approximately 305,000 revolvers. Both products are known as the Model of 1917.

An interesting note in the early production of 1911 pistols is the manner of marking the slide. Those produced by the Springfield Armory and Remington UMC are marked MODEL OF 1911 U. S. ARMY on the right side of the slide. Those manufactured by Colt were marked according to the contract, and those purchased for the Navy are stamped MODEL OF 1911 U. S. NAVY.

Shortly after WW I, additional modifications were recommended and in the mid '20s the M1911A1 appeared. No major changes were made and only minor external alterations in its appearance resulted. The mainspring housing was arched and the trigger shortened to improve the grip. The grip safety tang was extended and the hammer spur shortened to prevent pinching the web of the hand during cocking. These, and the removal of some metal on the receiver just aft of the trigger, constituted the first changes. It was at this point in its manufacture that the United States Property stamp appeared over the serial number on the right side of the receiver.

and close to the general's side



Previously this marking had been placed well forward on the left side of the receiver. The apparent reasoning behind this was to foil efforts to conceal the identity of a stolen pistol by removal of the property mark. By placing it just over the serial number, its removal would necessitate defacing the serial number as well.

Actually, the naive attempt to take "the Curse" off a stolen pistol by filing out the property stamp was a lost cause anyway. It is not even necessary to resort to the numerous modern police methods of determining whether a machine stamp has been removed, since a visual inspection can quickly establish that a given pistol was manufactured for a government contract. The serial number has a prefix, which is stamped as a part of the number and varies according to the intended market. It is pretty generally understood that to deface or alter the manufacturer's serial number on a firearm is a violation of Federal Law, regardless of the previous legal status of the weapon. Thus, a 1911 pistol with the serial prefix of "No." but with no United States Property mark in the appropriate position, is obviously open to suspicion.

Just prior to WW II, the width of the front sight was increased with a correspondingly wider and deeper notch in the rear sight. Again, production by Colt, the sole producer of this pistol between wars, was inadequate to the need. Contracts were let to additional contractors once more and pistols were produced by the Ithaca Gun Company, Remington Rand and, of course, by the Colt Mfg. Co. Contracts were also let to the Union Switch and Signal Co., Singer Sewing Machine Co. and other sub-contracts for parts such as barrels to various firms. Minor changes took place during this phase of manufacture. The trigger became an assembly of stampings, the broad surface of the hammer spur was eliminated, the mainspring housing was grooved lengthwise in place of machine checkering, plastic grips replaced walnut and the overall finish was a parkerized rather than a blued surface.

All of the parts are interchangeable both between the 1911, the 1911A1 and by the various contrac-

tors of all periods of its manufacture. Consequently, some pistols present quite a conglomerate picture after an overhaul, particularly if they were disassembled along with a mixed group. This is an academic point, however, since any combination provides the desired result—a reliable, functional item of military equipment.

More modern military semi-automatics have been developed certainly, and of these, one of the better and more recent specimens is the Belgian HiPower, 13-shot pistol. This 9mm weapon is a simplified and improved version of the M1911,



"... in every clime or place where we could take a gun"

and was John Browning's last military pistol design. Adopted by Belgium about 1935, its manufacture was continued throughout the German occupation during World War II. It was also manufactured by Inglis of Canada for the Canadian, Chinese and Greek armies during the war. The Russian Tokarev in 7.62mm, the Polish Radom in 9mm and several Spanish pistols in various calibers from 7.65mm to .45 caliber have either borrowed from Browning's design or copied it outright.

Some Spanish imitations are so faithful in external appearance that they can be mistaken at close range for the original. Specimens also exist which have been reported as manufactured in Norway and in various South American countries. Most of these pistols are in 9mm (.354) caliber, but the Norwegian and cer-

tain of the Spanish pistols are .45s.

It is interesting to note that, throughout the period of its manufacture by Colt, the 1911 and its variations have been produced commercially except during periods of war production. It has been manufactured in .22, .38, .45 and .455 calibers, and with minor deviations in finish, has closely followed the military evolution in design. A beautifully finished and match-conditioned model was available prior to WW II in .38 and .45 calibers, known as the "National Match." This pistol could be ordered with either fixed (service) or adjustable sights. Current production for civil consumption includes the .38 and .45 pistols and the .22 conversion unit fitting either.

Also available, and constituting the most recent adaptation of the 1911 design, is the "Commander Model" lightweight line. These are made in .38 (Super), 9mm (Luger) and .45 (ACP) employing an alloy receiver. Numerous changes appear in this model to reduce both the weight and dimensions of the pistol.

Many are the arguments as to the desirability of a .45 automatic as an individual arm. Varied are the preferences as to the trigger and the mainspring housing. Awful are the disparaging remarks overheard on the pistol range—by salt and recruit. And heavy is a .45 automatic halfway up a Korean mountain.

But it is not the purpose of this discussion to defend or to damn the .45. Rather, it is to point out that over 40 years ago a man designed a machine. A machine which, with one hand, can be made to put an enemy down for the count with six more immediate tries in case you err. It is a machine which will operate even when it has not had the best of care. It has been carried by Marines for over 40 years and is better known to a greater age group of Americans than any pistol in the world. It has been the comfort or the curse, according to the point of view and circumstances, of men in three wars and numerous campaigns in "every clime and place where we could take a gun." The result of over 725 machine operations, this compact, two-and-a-half pound fistfull has covered many a mile in the holsters of U. S. Marines and is doubtless destined to cover many more.

USMC

RETIREMENT AND I

Part Two — Enlisted Personnel of the Regular Marine Corps


By Major John McNiff

EVERY SO OFTEN HEADQUARTERS, Marine Corps will announce retirement action on certain enlisted men and list the persons affected by such action. A reader of such an announcement will observe groups of names listed under headings such as "Temporary Disability," "Permanent Disability," "From Temporary Disability to Permanent Disability," "Fleet Marine Corps Reserve," "Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Retired" and "Retired List (30 years)." This article is designed to explain how an enlisted Marine qualifies for these retirement categories.

The temporary disability list and the permanent disability list were created by the Career Compensation Act of 1949. In recent months these disability lists have been swelled by the Korean War casualties. But before these casualties, or any other Marine can be retired for physical disability, a determination must be made by the Secretary of the Navy as to whether the man is entitled to it. While the Secretary ultimately directs the disposition of each case, this disposition is made only after the Secretary reviews the findings of a chain of medical and reviewing boards which screen the case. If the individual whose retirement is under consideration so desires he may have counsel, present evidence and be fully heard before these administrative findings are made and submitted to the Secretary.

If the Secretary finds that:

1. a regular Marine entitled to receive basic pay is unfit to perform the duties of his grade by reason of physical disability
2. that such disability is not due to the intentional misconduct or willful neglect of such member and that such disability was not incurred during a period of unauthorized absence of such member
3. that such disability is 30 per cent or more
4. that such disability was the proximate result of the performance of active duty



5. that such disability *may* be of a permanent nature—the name of such man shall be placed upon the temporary disability retired list and he shall be entitled to receive disability retirement pay.

During time of war or during a national emergency (the national emergency caused by the Korean War is still in effect) condition "4" need not be established. During such a period any disability incurred

in line of duty is considered to be the proximate result of the performance of active duty. In other words, at present it makes no difference whether you are disabled while performing duty or while on leave or liberty—you have 24-hour coverage.

When the country is enjoying a period of peace and no national emergency exists, it is necessary to have completed eight years of active service before you can qualify for

disability retirement without establishing condition "4." What a recruit now has during a national emergency can be obtained in peace time only upon the completion of eight years' active service.

A man cannot be carried on the temporary disability retired list for more than five years. As long as his name is carried on the list his disability retirement pay will be not less than 50 per cent of basic pay of the grade held by him at the time of the placement of his name on the list. With 50 per cent as a minimum, his disability retirement pay is computed:

(a) $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent \times years of active service \times basic pay of the grade held at the time of going on list.

(b) Percentage of disability \times basic pay of the grade held at the time of going on list.

For example a man with 60 per cent disability and 20 years service would undoubtedly elect to have his disability retirement pay computed by formula (b), i.e., 60 per cent of basic pay as against $20 \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent or 50 per cent of basic pay under formula (a).

In no case shall disability retirement pay exceed 75 per cent of basic pay.

If you have held a temporary rank or grade higher than the one held at the time you go on either the permanent or temporary disability retired list, and there is a determination by the SecNav that you served satisfactorily in such higher rank or grade, your disability retirement pay shall be computed on the basis of the basic pay of such higher rank or grade.

Whenever disability is found to be permanent, and the other conditions numbered above are met, the individual concerned is permanently retired and his name goes on the permanent disability list. This determination may be made at the beginning of a case or after he has been put on the temporary disability list. Those on the temporary list are examined periodically.

When a man's name is placed on the permanent disability retired list his retired pay is computed as it is for those on the temporary retired list, except that the law does not require that he receive a minimum of 50 per cent of basic pay.

Placement on either the temporary or permanent disability retired list requires a finding of disability of 30 per cent or more. Disability of less than 30 per cent might possibly render a Marine unfit to perform the duties of his rating, and if it is permanent he is seldom permitted to remain on duty. However, it is the policy of the Marine Corps to give consideration to anyone with over 12 years of service so that, if he so desires, he may continue on duty and round out the time necessary for non-disability retirement.

If a separation occurs in a case where disability is under 30 per

time prescribed. As you can see, going "over the hill" is only one phase of unauthorized absence. The other phases can exist while you are aboard. However, anyone disabled as the result of an occurrence during unauthorized absence could eventually apply to the Veterans Administration for compensation as a disabled veteran provided he is discharged under conditions other than dishonorable. The same would apply to anyone who, though eligible for severance pay, is ineligible for retirement pay.

Any Marine who has completed 20 years of active service and has suffered a permanent disability of



cent, severance pay is payable. Severance pay for physical disability is in every such case an amount equal to two months basic pay \times years of active service, but not to exceed a total of two years basic pay. For example, a sergeant with five years' service would receive $\$137.59 \times 2 \times 5$ or $\$1375.90$.

Do not overlook the effect of unauthorized absence upon these disability retirement or severance benefits. The law plainly excludes from consideration a disability incurred during a period of unauthorized absence. Unauthorized absence under Article 86 of UCMJ now includes failing to go to appointed place of duty at the time prescribed without proper authority, or going from that place without proper authority, or without proper authority being absent from unit, organization or other place of duty at which you are required to be at the

less than 30 per cent which, with less than 20 years of active service, would qualify him for severance pay, but not for retirement pay, can be retired with pay of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent \times years of service \times monthly basic pay. By this retirement provision a man with 20 years or more will get retired pay of 50 per cent or more of basic pay, and being a disability retirement all of it would not have to be included as income in an income tax return. A percentage of basic pay equal to the percentage of disability is not subject to income tax.

The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 included the provisions of law which today permit enlisted Marines to retire upon the completion of at least 20 years of active duty. Because of a provision in the law that a fractional year of six months or more shall be considered a full year for purposes of this particular benefit, a



man is actually eligible to request retirement after he has completed 19 years and six months of active service.

Retiring under this law is really transferring to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. When a man has the necessary time, he may request that he be transferred to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. After such transfer, except when on active duty, he receives pay at the rate of 2½ per cent of basic pay received at the time of transfer \times the number of years of active service.

A request for transfer to the FMCR can be initiated any time after 19 years and six months are completed. The right to request a transfer is not lost if not exercised immediately after the minimum time is completed. The more time a man has before requesting such a transfer, the more retired pay he received. Transferring after 20 years pays 50 per cent of basic pay, 21 years pays 52½ per cent, 22 years pays 55 per cent, and so on.

A master sergeant who transfers to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve

after 20 years receives retired pay of 50 per cent of \$275.18 or \$137.59 per month. Assuming that his age at transfer was 38, that he performed no more active duty after transfer (which would increase his retired pay), and that he died at the age of 65, his retired pay over the years would total \$44,579.16.

The retired pay authorized after transfer to the FMCR shall be increased ten per cent for all men who may be credited with extraordinary heroism in the line of duty as finally determined by the SecNav. The maximum retired pay authorized is 75 per cent of the active duty basic pay being received at the time of transfer.

For the purpose of computing the time of active service required for transfer to the FMCR, all active service in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force or Coast Guard is counted.

Men who are transferred after 20 years may be ordered to active duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress for the duration of

the war or national emergency and for six months thereafter. They may also be ordered to active duty without their consent in time of national emergency declared by the President. Such active duty shall be included in the computation of their total service for the purpose of computing their retired pay when they return to an inactive duty status. Furthermore, if during such active duty they are advanced in grade their retired pay, when they resume an inactive duty status, shall be based on it. In time of peace not more than two months active duty in each four-year period may be required. This duty is not included in time of service or pay computations.

As the law now stands, if a temporary officer whose permanent status is enlisted, reverts to his enlisted rank in order to retire in 20 years by transferring to the FMCR, his retired pay is computed on the basic pay of his enlisted rank at the time of transfer. When he completes 30 years and goes to the retired list he may be placed on that list with the highest rank, including officer's rank, in which he served satisfactorily, before and after transfer to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, and shall be entitled to receive retired pay based on such higher rank, provided he held that rank before July 1, 1946. More about that later in this article.

After transfer to the FMCR each man shall be examined physically at least once during each four-year period. Any retired pay which may be due him shall be forfeited when so ordered by the SecNav upon failure to report for inspection under such conditions as the SecNav may prescribe. A man found not physically qualified upon a quadrennial examination shall be retired with retired pay he is then receiving. If he remains physically qualified he stays in the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve for whatever time, which added to active service, gives a total of 30 years service. He is then put on the retired list of the Regular Marine Corps with the pay he is then legally entitled to receive including all permanent additions to base pay authorized by law. It is then that he receives the benefit of a familiar law which requires that

personnel of the FMCR temporarily advanced or appointed to higher rank during their careers shall, when subsequently retired, be advanced to the highest grade and rank in which, as determined by the SecNav, they served satisfactorily under temporary appointments. They shall also receive retired pay based on such higher rank.

The foregoing should demonstrate plainly that the longer a Marine stays on active duty with the Corps after completing 20 years, the greater is his retired pay and, if he transfers to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, the less time he spends in that component before going to the retired list.

The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 also provides that all enlisted men transferred to the FMCR under the retirement provisions of that Act shall, upon completion of 30 years service, be transferred to the retired list of the Regular Marine Corps. Men who go to the retired list via the FMCR either upon the completion of 30 years, or earlier for disability arising after transfer to the FMCR, are referred to as the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Retired.

The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Retired should not be confused with members of the Marine Corps Reserve who are on the Marine Corps Reserve Retired List established by the Reserve Act of 1952, or the Naval Reserve Retired List created by Public Law 810—80th Congress (1948). The latter two retired categories and their purposes are treated in detail in the third and last article of this series which is devoted to the retirement rights and benefits of the Marine Corps Reserve.

When an enlisted member of the Marine Corps shall have served 30 years of active service he shall, upon making application to the President, be placed on the retired list of the Marine Corps with 75 per cent of the pay of his rank. In computing the necessary 30 years time for retirement under this provision of law, all service in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, and all creditable service in the Coast Guard, shall be credited. Furthermore, he is entitled to be advanced to the highest rank in which, as determined by the SecNav, he served satisfactorily under a temporary



appointment.

The SecNav is authorized in time of war or when a national emergency exists to call any enlisted person on the retired list into active service for such duty as he may be able to perform. Any man on the retired list who is ordered to active duty is eligible for promotion and shall be entitled to the pay and benefits of the rank to which promoted. When he is relieved from active duty he can be retained upon the retired list in the rank held by him at the time of such relief with retired pay and allowance of such rank.

When we are 22 we do not see retirement as we do at 42 and some Marines at the earlier age do not bother to figure out in dollars and cents the income that may lie ahead for them. Let us demonstrate in figures the current 30-year retirement entitlement of a master sergeant who is actually serving as such

and a master sergeant who has been serving under a temporary appointment as a CWO since before 1946 (a W-4 under the Career Compensation Act of 1949). The former retires in 30 years with retired pay of \$229.32 a month or \$2751.00 per year. If he is age 48 at retirement his life expectancy is 17 years. During those 17 years he will receive \$46,761.00 in retired pay. This represents \$1,540.00 for each of the 30 years devoted to the Marine Corps. The latter retires in 30 years with retired pay of \$363.17 a month or \$4,358.04 a year. If he is 50 at retirement his life expectancy is 15 years. During those 15 years he will receive \$65,370.60. This represents \$2,180.00 for each of his 30 years in the Marine Corps.

Many of you reading this will some day become warrant officers. On December 31, 1953, the Marine Corps had 700 temporary and 679



regular warrant officers in all four grades. Retirement of these warrant officers and future warrant officers will be governed by the Warrant Officer Act of 1954 recently enacted by the 83d Congress, which became effective on November 1, 1954. The basic purpose of the act is to provide a statutory career plan for present and future warrant officers in the Armed Forces, which will be

SecNav the matter of promotion for temporary and reserve warrant officers. It provides that after given periods of time in grade, permanent regular warrant officers will be mandatorily considered for promotion by selection boards, and if they twice fail to be selected they will be separated with severance pay. In lieu of severance pay a warrant officer may be enlisted if authorized, or

rant officer serves at least three years and is separated before completing 20 years of active service necessary for retirement, he is entitled to severance pay. This pay is two months basic pay for each year of active service, with a limit of two years basic pay, for those separated because of promotion failure; and one month's basic pay for each year of active service, with a limit of one year of basic pay for those separated because of unfitness.

Any warrant officer who has completed 20 years of active service may apply for retirement. It is in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy as to whether the application will be accepted. The formula for computing retired pay is the same as all others. This provision of the bill authorizes the retirement of temporary and permanent warrant officers of the Marine Corps, including any component thereof (i.e., reserve warrant officers).


This provision for the retirement of temporary warrant officers is a compelling reason for the expected enactment of a law permitting the 20-year retirement of those serving temporarily in commissioned officer ranks.

Male warrant officers who have reached 62 will be mandatorily retired if they have completed at least 20 years of active service with the following exceptions:

1. Male permanent regular warrant officers who complete 30 years of active service prior to age 62 will be retired after completing 30 years unless authorized to remain on active duty until age 62.

2. The separation of any person who on November 1, 1954, is a male permanent or reserve warrant officer and completes less than 20 years of active service at age 62 may be deferred until the completion of 20 years, but not later than age 64.

Looking back over the retirement benefits offered by the service a man should think at least twice before he gives up the future income he has built up by his previous enlistments. For if he returns to civilian life before he has accomplished the magical "20" or more, unless he has been retired physically before that time, he throws away money just as surely as if he had refused an inheritance or a trust fund. USMC



similar in many respects to the plan now in effect for Regular Commissioned Officers under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

The act establishes four military grades for warrant officers: Warrant Officer W-1 and Chief Warrant Officer in the grades of W-2, W-3 and W-4, and the term "warrant officer" includes those in all four grades. Chief warrant officers of the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard will continue to be commissioned warrant officers. It should be noted that the Career Compensation Act of 1949 in establishing four warrant officer pay grades (W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4) did not establish any corresponding military grades. The present grade that each warrant officer occupies will be renamed to correspond with one of the four newly established grades. This process is called distribution. The SecNav may thereafter, or at the time of distribution, redistribute warrant officers to a higher grade—but no warrant officers will be reduced in grade as a result of redistribution.

The promotion features of the act only apply to permanent regular warrant officers and leave to the

if on active duty as a commissioned officer continue on duty with consent of the SecNav.

If a warrant officer has completed 18 but less than 20 years of active service upon his second failure of selection, he will be permitted to complete 20 years of active service in order to be entitled to retired pay. If, in addition, selection boards find that the record of a warrant officer establishes unfitness, he will be retired or separated. The earlier laws did not provide for a system of forced attrition for warrant officers not selected for promotion.

The act authorizes the SecNav to make appointments as warrant officer other than appointment to a permanent regular grade accomplished by a commission which must be made by the President with the consent of the Senate. The SecNav may terminate within three years or cause retirement or separation at any time of any permanent warrant officer who fails to meet moral and professional qualifications.

This bill introduces the concept of severance pay for permanent regular warrant officers eliminated for failure of promotion. If a war-

EXCELSIOR!

By MSgt C. F. McPride

YEARS AGO IT WAS AN OFFICE held in awe, rather than just in respect. Lower ranks steered clear of it; staff grades went in, stated their business, and left as soon as possible; second lieutenants tiptoed by it . . . field grade officers wouldn't think of passing it without looking in and passing the time of day . . . that is if the sergeant major didn't appear to be too busy.

At the company level the first sergeant held sway—he was the company commander's confidant and right hand man . . . he was the "Top," in more ways than one. Woe to the man who crossed the "Top"—sorry was the individual who failed to knock before he crossed the threshold.

These, then, were the top NCOs, the sergeant major at battalion and above, the first sergeant at company. In the field the gunnery sergeant took over and at platoon level it was the platoon sergeant. These staff NCOs received respect and special privileges, but along with it went the responsibilities of the rank.

They knew how to bark an order, how to hold a formation or drill a squad, platoon, company or battalion if necessary . . . they had the bearing and the dignity.

In the past year the Commandant has done everything in his power to elevate the NCO once again to his proper pinnacle. Directives have been issued to bring back the rank titles and billets of the sergeant major and the first sergeant and the proper steps have been taken to insure that only qualified men will be assigned these billets.

Down the line came other directives. Master sergeants would no longer have to lay out clothing for IG inspections, but would fall out in uniforms designated by the IG teams in the same manner used to inspect commissioned and warrant officers.

Almost in the same breath came another special privilege . . . staff noncoms would be permitted to buy clothing at cash sales without a witnessing officer being present.

These orders seemed to cover

petty details on the face of it but, to many, they were a move in the right direction . . . a lot of the petty details have been sticking in the craws of good staff noncoms . . . they were the leaves brewing the bitter tea of discontent.

The stock of the noncom was on the way up! Implementation of the old ceremonial drill gave the corporals a chance to bark their orders while in ranks and it sent the staff NCOs scurrying to their books and talking shop over their brew at the club.

But it is a long road back.

The Commandant can put out an order a day for the next year; he could flagrantly grant the NCOs every privilege in the book (and a few out of it), but would it do the trick? Would orders, privileges and directives suddenly make a "Dan Daly" out of every noncom?

Directives, orders and extra privileges won't make a tinker's dam of a difference unless every man gets behind the Commandant's program and does his utmost to make a success of it.

Officers can start the ball rolling. They must remember to call an NCO aside if they wish to reprimand him. A dressing down should never be administered within sight or hearing of lower rated men. Separate messes should be set up for all noncoms. Staff can be incorporated in one, corporals and sergeants in another. The messes need not be elaborate. If need be they could be several tables set aside in the general mess with a simple sign reading "NCO Mess." And in return, the officers should demand that when given authority, the NCO should seize upon it and handle the job. If incompetence is tolerated, what premium can be placed on efficiency?

But the biggest job is placed squarely before the NCOs themselves. They must raise themselves by their own bootstraps as it were.

The first step is to get right with the "book." Is your uniform correct? Are you wearing your proper ribbons? Are you right by the "book?" If you are, then by heavens, give those hell who aren't right, let none

pass you by—correct them!

Do you know your stuff on the drill field? Can you take your place with confidence and carry out your assignment with authority? If you can't, then burn some midnight oil until you can.

Now to the next step—the Commandant has granted staff NCOs the right to carry swagger sticks . . . the reaction has been lukewarm . . . "Why? What good will it serve? I'll look silly" . . . are a few of the reactions.

The only instance in which a swagger stick looks out of place when carried by a man in uniform is when the man is not sharp enough to support the stick. With the stick must go spit-shined shoes; knife-edged, creased uniforms; close-cropped hair and a military bearing. Nothing less will suffice.

Just after the Commandant requested that all officers carry swagger sticks, a survey was made on how many had been sold at a local military haberdasher. The proprietor said that business was good—he had sold quite a few sticks. But what amazed him was the fact that his shoe polish sales had doubled. A little thing, but it demonstrates what the stick can do.

Now staff NCOs have been given the privilege of carrying swagger sticks. It is a right that should be seized and guarded jealously by every staff NCO. It should become a badge of the rank, and the privileges that go with it . . . another milestone in the march to NCO prestige.

But what effect will the directives, orders and privileges authorized by the Commandant have on the status of the NCO if they won't help themselves? Their status will drop to that of another pay grade . . . there will be no knocking on the first sergeant's door and the staff sergeants will be lining up and marching to chow.

The Commandant is doing all he can to restore the NCO to his former pinnacle but he can't do it all by himself.

Let's all of us get behind him!



The Basic School has a single goal—
training students for duty as infantry platoon
leaders—a vital billet to the Marine Corps

BASIC SCHOOL

By Col R. L. Murray



IN THESE DAYS, WHEN MILITARY men are required to be not only leaders, but masters of many complex machines and weapons of warfare, nothing is more important to the efficiency of the officer corps than the system of military schooling established within all the armed services.

Within the Marine Corps system of officer education, no school is more important than the Basic School. It is here that all newly commissioned officers, with few exceptions, get their first indoctrination into the customs and traditions of the Corps. If the staff has carried out its responsibilities properly, the student learns the meaning of "Semper Fidelis," and why the Marine Corps has never failed in its duties to the Nation. He learns the meaning of duty and leadership, and why these are so vital to the Corps, and develops a deep pride in being a part of an organization with a tradition of military excellence dating back 179 years.

The Basic School is important, too, because it insures that all new officers have the same general level of military knowledge. By its emphasis on training the student for duty as an infantry platoon commander, it gives him a solid foundation for later specialization in the myriad of arts necessary to a modern fighting organization.

The Basic School insures that the Marine Corps will continue to be a sound, healthy organization, ready always to perform any task assigned in a competent, professional manner.

The size of the student body and the length of the course have varied widely over the years. There were classes in the years before World War II with an enrollment as small as 12 or 14 officers. Recently, classes have had as many as 1,130. From a normal nine months course, it has been cut, during times of emergency, to as short as three months.

Currently, each class contains from approximately 180 to 1,100 students. These classes are convened throughout the year, and at certain times of the year there may be as many as four different classes in session, each at a different stage of training in the course.

In past years, the Basic School has been only responsible for the training of newly commissioned officers, with the officer candidate courses being conducted at other commands. Since the Korean war, however, there has been a gradual consolidation of all officer training at Quantico. Now, Basic School is responsible for the conduct not only of the Basic Course, but also of all the various officer candidate courses. Included in these courses are the candidate and officer training courses for the Women Marines.

Specifically, the mission of the Basic School is to conduct resident pre-basic courses for all Marine Corps officer candidates, to include basic military instruction, leadership development and screening of the students; and to conduct resident basic officers courses to train newly commissioned Marine Corps officers in their duties and responsibilities as company grade officers, with particular emphasis on the duties of infantry platoon commanders.

The sources of students for the Basic Course are: Naval Academy graduates, graduates of the candidate courses (which will be dis-



cussed in a moment), temporary officers appointed from the enlisted ranks, NROTC graduates, and officers commissioned from other services, such as ROTC (Army) graduates.

There are four candidate courses at the present time designed to offer an opportunity to obtain a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve.

The Officer Candidate Course is of ten weeks duration and classes are convened several times a year. This course is open to college graduates who enlist in the Marine Corps for the purpose of attending the OCC, and to certain enlisted personnel who meet designated standards. Graduates are commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve and unsuccessful candidates continue serving in their enlisted status.

Very similar to the OCC in syllabus content is the Platoon Leaders Course. This course is divided into two sessions of six weeks each convened only in the summer time. Eligible for the PLC program are college undergraduates who desire a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve upon graduation from college. Normally, the student attends the junior session in one summer and the senior session the next summer, although in certain instances he may attend both courses during one summer period. If he successfully passes the course, he is commissioned upon graduation from college.

The OCC and PLC courses are very nearly identical in purpose and scope. Both are aimed to give the student basic military indoctrination, inspire the development of esprit de corps and to give instruction and practical application of leadership principles. Physical conditioning and development of a proper military bearing are also stressed throughout the course. Concurrent with the instruction is the process of screening. All candidates are carefully evaluated as to their attitude, adaptability to military life, qualities of leadership and mental ability. The cases of candidates who are believed not to meet the standards of the Corps are carefully considered by their platoon leader, company and battalion commanders, an advisory board and, finally, by the Commanding Officer of the Basic School. Thus, a rejected candidate cannot complain that his case was handled arbitrarily.

There is one other male pre-basic course, the NROTC summer cruise. This course is different in scope and

purpose from the OCC and PLC courses because the students are regularly enrolled in the NROTC program in college and study military science and tactics throughout the school year. NROTC students attend one six-week course at Quantico, normally between their junior and senior year of college. This six-week course is designed to



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supplement the work they receive in college and to introduce them to the type of operations conducted by the Marine Corps.

The fourth candidate course is the Women Officers Training Course. The WOTC is divided into two six-week periods, junior and senior, and is open to college under-graduates, college graduates and qualified enlisted women. This course gives basic military instruction with emphasis on administration and leadership. Successful completion of the course depends largely on the qualities of leadership possessed by the candidates.

Generally speaking, the level of instruction in the male candidate courses does not go above the squad level. This is true for two reasons. First of all, in the limited time available in the candidate courses it is not possible to teach thoroughly more than the most elementary tactics; and secondly, by concentration on a level no higher than squad the student is better prepared to go on to the platoon and higher tactics taught in the Basic Course.

There is one exception to the above stated general principle, and that is the NROTC summer course. This course is integrated with the syllabus pursued by the student during the college year and is on a little higher level than the other candidate courses.

Once the candidate has successfully completed the pre-basic course and has been commissioned, he attends the Basic Course. To success-

fully complete the Basic Course the student must maintain a satisfactory average academically and leadershipwise. Academic grades are obtained by means of a series of objective type examinations given periodically throughout the course. Leadership grades are based on performance. The markings are given by staff officers and contemporaries.

Academic subjects have not changed to any appreciable extent throughout the years, but the lessons themselves are constantly reviewed to keep the instruction up to date with respect to tactics, techniques and equipment. Instruction is conducted by means of classroom lectures, map problems and other applicatory exercises, by field exercises and terrain exercises. A considerable portion of the course consists of field work, of which approximately 30 per cent is night work.

To gain experience in leadership and to allow the staff to assess the leadership capabilities of the student, each company of students (approximately 180) is organized with students acting in the capacity of company commander, company executive officer, first sergeant, supply sergeant, platoon leaders, squad leaders and fire team leaders. These student leaders (working under the regular company officers) are assigned for a period of one week after which a new set of leaders are assigned and so on throughout the course. The student leaders are responsible for the discipline, timeliness, uniform and general police of the areas of their units and effort is made to conduct as much business as possible through the student chain of command. In addition, students are given opportunity for development of leadership capabilities on all field exercises—leadership billets are rotated throughout the course of the exercise.

Within the limitation imposed by the shortness of the course, the Basic Course graduate is well grounded in the fundamentals of his profession, although it is freely admitted by the staff that additional instruction and guidance is required before the new officer can be considered thoroughly competent. However, changes in the syllabus and courses are constantly being probed.

A recent innovation is the addition of a post-graduate course for

the regular officers of each Basic Course, to include those student officers selected for regular appointment. This four-weeks course will convene immediately after conclusion of each Basic Course class and will provide instruction in basic administrative policies and procedures of the Marine Corps. It is designed to familiarize the newly commissioned officer with the use of official publications and with procedure involved in personnel accounting and management.

By virtue of the fact that the Basic School conducts all pre-basic courses as well as the basic course, very close coordination is possible between the various courses and continuity is assured. Likewise, the same policies, with respect to indoctrination, discipline, etc. are insured for both pre-basic as well as basic course students. This is desirable since the development of a young officer from enrollment in a pre-basic course to graduation from the basic school is all part of one task.

This article has described in rather general terms the Basic School as of today. Times may dictate changes in organization or scope of instruction, but the basic mission of the school will never change, and that is to produce enthusiastic, competent Marine officers eager to assume the responsibilities of leadership and to carry on the traditions bequeathed them by their predecessors.

US MC

*A specialty upon graduation—
infantry platoon commander*



passing in review

An Old Pro . . .

KESSELRING—A SOLDIER'S RECORD, by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, with introduction by S. L. A. Marshall. William Morrow & Co., New York, 1954. 381 pages, maps, photographs, index. \$5.00

This is the first, and perhaps the last, autobiography to be published by a senior military commander of the Third Reich. On this count alone, the book deserves serious attention. Let me hasten to add that it also merits attention and study on other grounds, the most notable of which are its high professionalism, its detached and temperate critical tone and its careful reporting and evaluation of World War II as seen through the eyes of an air-ground leader at the highest levels.

For Marine Corps readers, the fact that Kesselring (whose unsullied standing survived a war-crimes condemnation since set aside) was not singly a ground officer or an aviation commander, but an *air-ground* commander, has special interest. Aside from our own airman-soldier, Geiger, who was unique among Allied leaders in having exercised high command both of aviation and of ground operations in World War II, Kesselring is probably the only other World War II air force officer who possessed the broad experience which made him as capable a commander of major ground operations as he was in the air. Kesselring might well be thought of as a German Geiger—as this pearl of wisdom for air-power zealots gives testimony: "But one piece of advice I give to all Air Field-Marshals: do not become a one-sided technician, but learn to think and lead in terms of all three services."

But before reflecting further on these excellent memoirs, let me summarize the book briefly.

Kesselring begins, as might be expected, with his years as an artillery officer in the German Army before

during and after World War I. In 1933 he was transferred to the newly created Luftwaffe. He then takes the reader with him into World War II, in which he commanded the German air fleets directed against Poland and, subsequently, the Low Countries—campaigns in which his notable talents in close air support found historic expression. Immediately after the German conquest of the Continent in 1940, it fell to Kesselring to initiate the

outspokenly castigates the lack of prior preparation and the general military unsophistication implicit in Hitler's and the General Staff's approach to the tremendous amphibious problem (and opportunity) which confronted them. "Both Hitler and the General Staff," writes Kesselring, "thought in terms of continental warfare and shied at a war across the sea"—which is of course the historic, land-minded blunder of Army-dominated general



Battle of Britain, from the results of which he distills a conclusion that should be well remembered by the Severskys and latter-day Douhetts who talk of annihilating Russia in a few weeks of air raiding: "The tactical overwhelming of an inherently strong nation with a widely ramified war potential requires powerful and continually intensified day and night attack and terror raids continued over years."

In this portion of the book, Kesselring devotes almost a chapter to the never-consummated Operation "Sea Lion," Hitler's project for the amphibious/airborne invasion of England. The Field Marshal quite

staffs in whatever nation they wrest power.

Following the Battle of Britain, Kesselring led the 2d Air Command against Russia until November 1941, when he was again promoted, this time to the high post (and hot spot) of C-in-C South: theater commander of German forces in Africa, Italy and throughout the Mediterranean. From that time until March 1945, the Field Marshal waged an ably conducted, slowly losing defensive war, employing increasingly limited forces against enemies whose resources, proficiency and command of air and sea enlarged progressively. As beffited a Mediterranean

commander, he was frequently preoccupied with amphibious matters: first, with German-Italian schemes to seize Malta; and latterly with the Allied amphibious assaults on Sicily and the Italian peninsula. Here he comments acidly on the Allies: ". . . having conspicuously neglected to exploit the help of the navy and the air force to outflank or overhaul our troops in the (Italian) peninsula." And he concludes: "In the face of a perfect coordination of sea, land and air forces, invasions cannot be held up, even in well constructed coastal positions."

Repeatedly, like so many other German and Japanese commanders, Kesselring expresses awe at our "tremendous naval gunfire." Shortly after Salerno, for example, he writes, "In order to evade the effective shelling from warships, I authorized a disengagement on the coastal front, with the express proviso that the Volturno Line must not be abandoned before 15 October." Here is a naval gunfire triumph as notable as the destruction of the Mount Santa Rosa final defensive area of the Japanese on Guam.

As war closed in on Germany, Kesselring was recalled from Italy by Hitler to take command of the final defense of the Western Front, superseding von Rundstedt. This was Kesselring's final command, again foredoomed to defeat, again exercised with high skill. After the surrender, he went through the ordeal of a war crimes prosecution and death sentence which, after wide protest not only from the British public but from many other former enemies high and low, was finally set aside.

A Soldier's Record is not light reading, but it is greatly rewarding from a professional point of view. Time and time again, for example, Kesselring hammers home the requirement for an air-ground team between troops and tactical air. Here is how he exemplifies such teamwork in describing the assault on Tobruk in 1942: "The attack was launched with precision timing. The last bomb had hardly reached the ground before the assault, splendidly supported by dive-bombers and artillery, had carried the defense positions."

On troop leadership and command, Kesselring is also rewarding: "Convinced that the place of a commander is where a unit has had a reverse and a dangerous situation has arisen, I had chosen my battle headquarters close to the front. . ." or: "Maps and reports are never a substitute for personal observation."

For such an able memoir, it is a pity that the maps are so inadequate. Repeatedly in the text, one encounters references to places, dispositions, maneuvers and positions which are nowhere detailed (or are confusingly depicted) in the maps. This fault deprives the reader, on many occasions, of complete insight into the tactical nuances. One other criticism, perhaps, is that although one closes the book with a feeling of marked rapport and sympathy with Kesselring, more human detail, consistent with the general high level of the work, would have been appreciated. This desire to know the author better is whetted rather than satisfied by a well written and friendly prefatory vignette of Kesselring in prison-camp by our own military historian, S. L. A. Marshall.

That Kesselring's memoirs are highly recommended by this reviewer goes without saying, especially in contrast with some of the watery, ghost-written works turned out, alas, by commanders on our own side. In *A Soldier's Record*, we have a book which will deservedly bear notice today and in the future.

Reviewed by LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr.

Packaged Military Advice . . .

SOLDIERS AND SOLDIERING—A. P. Wavell (Field Marshall Earl Wavell)
174 pages. London: Jonathan Cape.

\$2.00

This collection of essays, articles and lectures places in one light, but meaningful package, the guidance to be derived from an outstanding military career covering a span of half a century. The late Field Marshal Wavell was one of Britain's most noted modern soldiers. The insight into his character offered by this little book, does much to clarify and define the real and the basic requirements for outstanding success in the military profession.

Scholar and poet, as well as great soldier, Wavell brings to each subject treated, a refreshing and enter-

taining approach, using just the right amount of the literary condiments to season the heavier military ingredients, creating thereby a highly palatable yet nourishing dish. Beginning with a series of three lectures on "Generals and Generalship," the book skips from subject to subject in much the same fashion as if the author were conducting a press conference, with all the reporters being members of the military profession having the common objective of gleaning valued basic advice and suggestion for the future. The range in time, resulting from the combination of scholar



and military expert in one mind, is typified by a piece on "Night Attack," wherein two such operations are generally analyzed; one, planned and led by the Gideon of the Old Testament of the Bible, the other by elements of the British XX Corps against the Turks in August of 1918. In another piece on "Military Genius," Wavell sets up certain criteria for rating the performance of the military greats, and then proceeds in exceptionally interesting style to line up such well known figures as Lee, Napoleon and Wellington, along with some others who are, perhaps, not as well known.

For those who prefer more current comments, there is an interesting piece on the late Field Marshal Rommel, wherein the "Desert Fox" is compared to Ney and Murat, and is given the high accolade of the following quotation:

"Among the chosen few,
Among the very brave, the very true."

In addition, a brief review of Field Marshall Montgomery's "Normandy To The Baltic" is included, which gives in its comments some rather

interesting hints as to the character of Britain's most famous living military figure.

Perhaps one of the finest character studies in recent letters, is that included in the essay on "Unorthodox Soldiers." In this piece Wavell covers T. E. Lawrence, the famed "Lawrence Of Arabia." He does it by giving a brief description of this legendary figure as a personal friend and close acquaintance. Considering its brevity, it is a masterpiece of authorship in the field of character sketching.

Because the content of this book is held to generalities and basic principles throughout, there is little to take issue with concerning the material included. Where Wavell (writing in the *London Times* at the end of World War II on "The Good Soldier") makes the statement that "The Army has again saved the nation," the heat from beneath the RAF and Royal Navy collars can almost be felt. But since his career covered half a century in the Army, no doubt the sister services have forgiven him this unilateral claim.

A review of this book could not be complete without mention of the appropriateness, to our time, of the essays on "Allied Co-operation" and on education within the Army. The latter, entitled "Minerva's Owl," (the Army term for the crest of the Army Staff College) deals with the delicate problem of democratic education within the Armed Forces and its possible effects on discipline. Tied to the necessity for preparing the civilian soldier mentally, as well as physically and technically for the future, Wavell hints broadly at his thesis when he says:

"The fate of our type of democracy will be decided in the next few years, and will depend in the end on the intelligence of the average citizen in understanding the issues before them, such as the wider pattern of world trade and international affairs."

The key to education within the Armed Services lies in Wavell's brief statement at the end of this treatment of this problem, "Character will always beat mere brains."

Set in no particular pattern or order, each piece of this book is neatly brief, direct and to the point. Engagingly dotted with bits of military history equated to current pro-

fessional problems, Wavell presents a very subtle, but powerful argument, that even in this highly technical and complex era of warfare much is to be learned from comprehensive study of the "Great Captains."

Gifted with a cleverness of pen and expression, the twinkle of a fine British sense of humor repeatedly shines through Wavell's excellent phraseology—thereby adding to Mr. Churchill's more colorful efforts to forever dispel the erroneous American impression that such a thing does not exist. From cover to cover, this is an excellent manual of fundamental guideposts for he who would climb the full ladder of military service.

Reviewed by Col J. P. Condon



First Into Rome...

THE BATTLE HISTORY OF THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION—George F. Howe, 471 pages, illustrated with maps. Washington: Combat Forces Press. \$6.50

This book is a factual history of the 1st Armored Division, described as "Old Ironsides, the first of the mighty Armored Force, the pioneer in the art and science of armor, . . . the first to engage German troops in World War II, . . . the first into Rome, and the first of the armored divisions in days of actual field service during World War II."

The account begins with the birth of the Armored Force in 1918; traces the development (and lack of development) through the period between wars and tells of the activation of the 1st Armored Division in 1940. Dr. Howe recounts the difficulties and confusion inevitable in the formation of a new arm. From the experiences of the division in the landing at Oran and its subsequent employment in Tunisia, it became apparent that there were

many lessons to be learned and mistakes to be corrected. In plain, unvarnished language the author gives a detailed account of each engagement in which the division participated. He tells how the division was "walloped" at Sidi-Bou-Zid, in eastern Tunisia. Most of the division did not participate directly in the battle at Kasserine Pass, but it was "at the bottom of its ladder of achievement" just prior to that battle, when it was forced to make a humiliating withdrawal from the nearby town of Sbeitla. Within a few months, however, the division was able to "get on its feet" and make up for these initial reverse by playing an important part in the sweep through Tunisia, the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, the capture of Rome and the crossing of the Po.

One characteristic of the book which stands out is that the author does not endeavor to cover up or minimize the mistakes, nor does he overemphasize the importance of the division in the big picture. The account ranges from the overall scheme of maneuver at theater and army group level to small unit tactics at company and platoon level. A number of eye-witness accounts lend the book an authentic combat flavor.

Dr. Howe has done a commendable job in preserving the battle chronicle of our first armored division. The student of military history and the casual reader alike, will find this book both informative and interesting.

Reviewed by Capt Robert H. Miller

Side-arm Bibliography...

THE AMERICAN SWORD 1775-1954
A Survey of the Swords Worn by the Uniformed Forces of the United States from the Revolution to the Close of World War II. By Harold L. Peterson, 274 pages. New Hope, Pa. 1954. Robert Halter—The River House. \$10.00

With the exception of the U. S. Navy, which recently reinstated their ceremonial sword for officers, the Marine Corps is the only United States service retaining this traditional arm.

As a practical weapon, the sword of course is an anachronism. Perhaps this is the reason why arms

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


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collectors are finally according the American sword some attention. It seems that as arms become utterly obsolete their collecting becomes popular. Thus it was successively with flintlocks, cap and ball muzzle loaders, early cartridge firearms and more recently the Colt Frontier revolver and the Winchester lever action rifle. A belated newcomer to this collection popularity contest is the American sword.

In view of this collecting trend, the revived use of the ceremonial sword and the renewed interest in American military traditions and antiquities, the publication of Harold L. Peterson's *The American Sword 1775-1945* is indeed timely.

Peterson, a foremost scholar in the field of weapons and military history and Chief of the Historical Investigations Branch, National Park Service, has authentically traced the history of the American sword from the Revolution to the present. From his own wide knowledge of the subject, from official sources, from examination of swords in the principal museums and private collections Peterson illustrates, describes and catalogues 186 of the more representative types of American swords. Standard officer and enlisted swords, as used in combat, are the most numerous types. These two categories include infantry, artillery, cavalry, dragoon, Marine and Navy swords. The subject of Marine Corps swords, both officer and enlisted, is concisely but completely presented. Other sections deal with cadet, diplomatic, presentation, militia officers' dress and the distinctive silver hilt swords.

Also covered are such related subjects, important to the arms student, as nomenclature, manufacturing methods, decoration, determination of dates, a directory of sword makers and comparative prices.

Peterson deals with the subject in such an orderly and authoritative manner, and yet with such a wealth of information, that *The American Sword* has been sponsored by The Company of Military Collectors and Historians as "a standard work of reference in the field of American military history." Such a sanction from this scholarly society may be taken as proof of this work's excellence.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart

Marine Corps Gazette • November, 1954

SQUADS RIGHT

THE RIFLE PLATOON

THE RIFLE PLATOON—The rifle platoon may be comprised of six squads or less, with one officer in charge as "platoon commander" and an NCO designated "platoon sergeant" as second in command.

In each platoon men are arranged, as far as practicable, according to height from right to left, the tallest on the right. Departures from this rule are authorized for the purpose of assigning men to duties which they are best fitted to perform and in order to maintain the integrity of squads. If any squad contains less than six men, it is either increased to that number by transfers from other squads or from the file closers, or it is broken up and its members assigned to other squads or posted in the line of file closers. These squad organizations are maintained by transfers, if necessary, until the platoon becomes so reduced in numbers as to necessitate a new division into squads. No squad contains fewer than six men.

Individual Duties—The platoon NCO is second in command of the platoon. He forms the platoon and receives the reports of squad leaders at all formations and, from his post in the file closers, supervises its drill and assists the platoon leader in control.

The platoon guides are responsible for the proper direction and step of the platoon. When sections drill as platoons or independently, the platoon guides become section leaders and, as such, drill and control their sections.

The section guides are file closers during platoon and company drill except when, for the purpose of variation in platoon drills and for the purpose of instructing NCOs in the duties of higher command, platoon commanders may designate their sections as platoons. The platoon may be then drilled as a company. The guides also assist in control by cautioning and correction whenever necessary.

The squad leaders are responsible for control of their squads. They


repeat such commands of platoon leaders as are contained herein.

All NCOs in the file closers assist in control of the platoon by cautioning and correcting whenever necessary. Other file closers post themselves and conform to the movements of the platoon.

The platoon in line is formed in

column are used to designate the actual right, center, left, leading or rear section or squad.

To Size the Platoon—The instructor arranges the men according to height in column at facing distance, the tallest men in front. Squad leaders place themselves according to height, the tallest as the seventh



double rank. It is divided into squads beginning on the right flank. Platoons of more than three squads are divided into two sections. If the number of squads in the platoon is even, the sections comprise an equal number of squads. If the number of squads is odd the right section is stronger.

This division of the platoon into sections may be accomplished to drill the platoon as a company, as discussed previously, or to give section leaders an opportunity of drilling their units. Sections and squads are numbered consecutively from right to left in each platoon. These designations do not change. For convenience in giving commands and for reference, the designations "right center" and "left" when in line, and "leading center" and "rear" when in

man, the others as every eighth man in rear. The instructor then commands 1. *In two ranks form platoon.* 2. MARCH 3. FRONT. At the command MARCH, the first man faces to the left; the second man places himself in the rear rank covering the first at a distance of 40 inches; both place the left hand upon the hip; the other men close in quick time and form alternately in front and rear rank as explained for the first two. Each man halts upon arriving at his proper place, faces to the left and executes right dress. All formed, the instructor commands FRONT.

Formations—The formations of the platoons are: line, column of squads, twos or files. The principal close order formations are the line and column of squads.

General Rules for the Guides—

The guides of a column of squads place themselves on the flank opposite the file closers. To change guides and file closers to the other flank, the platoon leader commands: 1. *File closers on the left (right) flank*, 2. *MARCH*. at the command *MARCH*, the file closers dart through the column and post themselves on the other flank; the platoon leader and guides change to the opposite flank.

Guides and file closers, when necessary, lengthen their steps to approximately 33 inches in order to contribute to the smoothness of movements. The following movements of guides and file closers, though not designated to be exact, add to the precision of platoon and company drill.

Being in line: 1. "Squads Right." The right guide takes two steps, faces to the right in marching, takes one step and marks time. The left guide takes two steps forward faces to the right in marching and marks time. 2. "Squads Right About." The right guide faces to the right in marching and takes two steps, faces to the right in marching and marks time. The left guide takes post in the same manner, except that he delays execution of the movement so that he will not interfere with the rear rank of the left squad. 3. "Squads Right, Column Right." The right guide faces to the right in marching and takes two steps, faces to the right in marching, takes one step and marks time; on the sixth count he takes one full step and then eight half steps. The left guide takes post as in squads right.

Being in column: 1. "Squads Right." When the guide is right the leading guide takes one step forward, faces to the right in marching and marks time. The rear guide takes two steps forward, faces to the right in marching and marks time. When the guide is left the leading guide takes one step forward, faces to the right in marching, takes two steps and marks time. The rear guide takes two steps forward, faces to the right in marching, takes two steps and marks time.

2. "Squads Right About." The leading guide takes one step forward, faces to the right in marching and takes two steps, faces to the right in marching and marks time.

The rear guide takes post in the same manner. The file closers take two steps forward, face to the right in marching, take two steps in the new direction, again face to the right in marching and mark time.


direct practicable route. The guide of a unit keeps direction by aligning two points to his front and marching on them.

Full step from half step or mark time—In all movements requiring the half step or mark time by the platoon or any part of the platoon, the guides and file closers take the full step on the same count as the platoon, or part thereof with which connected. In column of squads, each rank preserves the alignment toward the side of the guide. Guides and enlisted men in the line of file closers execute the manual of arms during drill unless specifically excused, when they remain at the order. During ceremonies they execute all movements.

Alignments—The alignments are executed at the command "Right Dress," the guide being established instead of the flank file. The guide and the rear-rank man of the flank file, toward which the dress is made, keep their heads and eyes to the front, and the rear-rank man covers his file leader. The left guide and the rear-rank man of the left file do not bring up their left arms while dressing. Whenever the position of alignment necessitates a considerable movement, such movement, at the command to dress, is executed by marching to the front or oblique, to the flank or backward, as the case may be, without other command and at the trail.

At each alignment, the platoon leader verifies the alignment of the front rank, rear rank and file closers of his platoon, executing a face in marching in moving to his successive positions. He posts himself in each case in prolongation of the rank, two paces from it and facing the point of rest. After having verified the alignment of the file closers, he faces to the right (left) in marching moves to a point three paces beyond the front rank, halts, faces to the left (right) and from this position commands: *FRONT*.

The platoon leader then marches parallel to the front of his platoon until opposite its center, when he halts and faces to the front. In opening ranks, the platoon leader aligns his platoon as usual, but after giving the command *FRONT*, he places himself three paces in front of the right guide and facing the front. US 



Formations of the Company

They regulate their execution, marking time if necessary, so as not to interfere with the movements of adjacent squads.

3. "Column Right." When the guide is right, the leading guide faces to the right in marching and than takes post by marching to the right oblique. When the guide is left, the leading guide marches by the right oblique until opposite his new line of march, when he executes a second right oblique.

4. "Right Front Into Line." The leading guide marches to the left oblique until opposite his post, takes up the half step until the leading squad comes abreast of him, when he takes up the full step.

5. "On Right Into Line." The leading guide faces to the right in marching and takes post by the most



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


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
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